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Introduction
The traditional concept of wilderness was a product of the time out of which it came.
Times have changed. The social context of conservation, how humans affect nature, and
scienti fic understanding of how ecosystems function have all shifted in ways that make the
wilderness idea problematic. The values that people found in wilderness are still relevant,
however. It is the way that they are tied together in the concept of wilderness that has
become a problem.
I propose a revised concept of wilderness that meets the concerns of critics of
wilderness, and accounts for the tension between the wild and the pristine, by making
wildness the sole necessary feature of wilderness.
Part of the justi fication of this reconception comes from what I call "epistemic
wildness." While we normally think of wildness in terms of things that exceed our control,
things are also wild in how they exceed our representations of them. Much of the value of
wilderness, especially in meeting contemporary environmental concerns, comes from its
epistemic wildness.
In chapter one, I will look at the traditional concept of wilderness. In chapter two, I'll
look at some of the criticism that this idea has received. In chapter three, I'll outline a revised
conception of wilderness that responds to these criticisms. In chapter four, I'll examine the
nature and value of epistemic wildness.
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Chapter One: The Naive Concept of Wilderness
1.0 Introduction
On April 10, 1963 the Wilderness Act passed the United States Senate by a
vote of 73 to 12, and on July 30, 1964 it passed the House of Representatives by 373 to 1.
(Nash 2001, p.226) At the time, at least, people liked wilderness and wanted to preserve it.
Part of the reason for the popularity of wilderness was that it uni fied a number of different
values into one concept. With changes in our understanding of the natural world and human
effects on it, and changes in the nature and scale of those human effects, however, the
various values that were uni fied in the traditional concept began to pull in different directions.
In this section I lay out the traditional concept of wilderness: what was taken to be wilderness,
why this was valuable, and the relation between wilderness preservation and
environmentalism.

1.1 Terms: Pristine and Wild
There are two fundamental parts to the concept of wilderness: pristineness and
wildness.
Pristineness refers to a natural system being unaffected by humans. That is, like how it
would be if humans never touched it. This usually translates into fidelity to an historical
baseline: a system is pristine if and only if it is the same as it was at some point in the past,
usually when first encountered by some group of people. As I use the term, it is synonymous
with ecological integrity, which Callicott et al. de fine as "native species populations in their
historic variety and numbers naturally interacting in naturally structured biotic communities.”
(Callicott et al. 1999, p.25) This is not necessarily static and can include a range of past
states: the “Historical Range of Variability.” (Keane et al., 2009) This is also often called
"naturalness," and even "wildness," but I will avoid these usages.
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Wildness, or "untrammeledness," refers to the quality of a natural system of being
uncontrolled by humans. The word trammel comes from the Old French word tramail, which
was a net for catching fish. Thus, untrammeled means unrestricted, free, autonomous. Ridder
de fines it as "an absence of rationally planned human intervention." (Ridder 2007, p.9) This
might also be called "naturalness," but I will avoid this usage.
An area where intense human intervention maintains fidelity to an historical baseline
would be pristine but not wild; an area that diverges from its historical state but is not the
subject of intentional human intervention would be wild but not pristine.

1.2 Wilderness
In this section I lay out a formulation of the way that people have traditionally thought
about wilderness. I do this in terms of precise logical relations. This is not intended to say that
everyone thought about wilderness in exactly these terms, nor that the relations I identify
were taken to be exactly as speci fied. This is only intended to generally and approximately
capture in a clear way the intuitions that informed talk about wilderness.

1.2.1 Pristine and Wild Lands
Pristineness and wildness were taken as individually necessary and jointly suf ficient for
an area to be a wilderness. An area had to be both the way it was before humans altered it,
and it had to be free from active human intervention; if it was both, it was a wilderness. This
can be seen in the 1964 Wilderness Act, where wilderness is both "an area where the earth
and its community of life are untrammeled by man" and "generally appears to have been
affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work substantially
unnoticeable." (Wilderness Act 1964, 2(c)) Sutter characterizes the wilderness conservation
movement as viewing both wildness and pristineness as fundamental to the concept of
wilderness. "The founders of the Wilderness Society did see wilderness areas as places
meant to preserve pristine nature… [but]… wilderness was as much about 'wildness,' the
2

absence of human control, as it was about pristine ecological conditions." (Sutter 2002, p.14)
Aplet and Cole re flect this when they say that "Landscapes can express any combination of
human control and historical fidelity. Where they are most untrammeled and unaltered, they
are called wilderness." (Aplet and Cole 2012, p.12)
Wildness was thought of as suf ficient for pristineness. That is, avoiding human
intervention in nature would preserve it in its historical state. This connection was a product of
the historical context of conservation during which wilderness preservation came of age. "A
century ago, the only way to halt the violence was to draw a line around a place and protect
its objects from the commercial onslaught. Preservation of natural conditions was equated
with protection from exploitation." (Aplet and Cole 2012, p.15)
Further, the ecological understanding at the time reenforced this connection. In the
in fluential theory of early 20th century plant ecologist Frederick Clements, "the surface of the
planet is divided into distinct natural units that he called plant formations. … Each unit is
de fined by a climax community, the community that with suf ficient time and in the absence of
disturbance will occupy the site." (Cooper 2007, p.37) Using this understanding of ecology
meant that managing with wildness–avoiding disturbance–would preserve and restore an
area to its pristine historical baseline, the climax. As Aplet and Cole put it: "Climax theory held
that all vegetation was at, or was returning to, a fully developed climax stage of succession
that was natural and characteristic of the region. All one needed to do to preserve natural and
historical conditions was to avoid disturbances such as logging, grazing, fire, and insect
outbreaks." (Aplet and Cole 2012, p.15)
This suf ficiency connection between wildness and pristineness meant that "eliminating
human impacts, maintaining historical fidelity, and not 'trammeling' the land could all be
achieved simultaneously on the same piece of ground." (Aplet and Cole 2012, p.18) This
perceived close connection often led to thinking of the wild and the pristine as synonymous,
or nearly so.
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1.2.2 Wilderness Values
There are a number of valuable traits associated with wilderness. Unlike
untrammeledness, however, these values were not seen to constitute wilderness. Rather,
they were seen to arise out of pristineness. As we will see, however, this connection is often
quite tenuous.

1.2.2.1 Aesthetic
"Halvor Steenerson of Minnesota declared that it was nonsense to claim that an
arti ficial lake would add to the beauty of the valley. 'You may as well improve upon the lily of
the field by handpainting it,' he pointed out, and added that all the city offered was a power
plant making a 'devilish hissing noise' and a 'dirty muddy pond.'" (Nash 2001, p.175) This
quote from Nash, discussing the Hetch Hetchy dam debate, gives us a good example of the
aesthetic considerations that were one of the first and most common justi fications for
wilderness preservation. But this is still obscure. Certainly, human-affected things can be
beautiful. Why are wilderness areas thought to be beautiful? How is the beauty of an area
connected to its untouched character? Why can not we improve the lilies?
We can get an answer to this question by looking at art history and aesthetic theory.
Wilderness was not always appreciated. "It was not until Englishmen became familiar with the
landscapes of Claude Lorrain and Salvator Rosa, Ruysdael and Hobbema, that they were
able to receive any visual pleasure from their surroundings." (Hussey 1967, p.2) In contrast to
classical and Renaissance understandings of beauty that relied on harmonious proportion
and appealed to the understanding, by the eighteenth century the West's conception of
beauty had come to rely on visual, formal aspects of the work of art that appealed to the
passions or imagination. This change, and the features of landscape that were thought to
appeal to the imagination, opened the possibility of pristine wilderness being found beautiful.
In Edmund Burke's Inquiry into the origin of our ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful,
he developed an aesthetic theory in which the objects perceived affected one of two
4

fundamental passions, bypassing the conscious mind, and resulting in two classes of
aesthetically pleasing objects. The first of these was the Beautiful, which affected the passion
for love and reproduction. "All those that were in any degree pleasing, attractive, smooth, and
gentle affected the instinct for self preservation and were called Beautiful." (Hussey 1967,
p.12) In terms of landscape, one might imagine a composed and rolling garden. In contrast to
(and incompatible with) Beauty, was the Sublime, which affected the passion of fear and selfpreservation. "All those that aroused passions connected with fear, in finity, dif ficulty, or pain
appealed to the other [the instinct for self-preservation], and were sublime." (Hussey 1967,
p.12-13) The Swiss Alps, encountered by young English aristocrats on the Grand Tour, were
a frequent subject for paintings that appealed to this ideal, which represented its subjects as
vast, obscure, powerful, in finite, and featuring darkness and silence. (Hussey 1967, p.59)
Burke's account was in fluential, but clearly left out a class of aesthetically pleasing
objects that fit into neither category. William Gilpin and Uvedale Price developed the concept
of the picturesque to fill this gap. "While the outstanding qualities of the sublime were
vastness and obscurity, and those of the beautiful were smoothness and gentleness, the
characteristics of the picturesque were 'roughness and sudden variation joined to irregularity,'
of from, colour, lighting, and even sound." (Hussey 1967, p.14) This was a formal criterion,
having to do with composition and sensual qualities of the work, but it lent itself particular
scenes: "old gnarled trees, sandy banks, water and windmills, rough heaths, rustic bridges,
stumps, logs, ruts, hovels, unkempt persons, and shaggy animals." (Hussey 1967, p.11)
The in fluence of these developments in aesthetics on the wilderness debate can be
seen in the fact that American landscape artists during the development of the idea of
wilderness, such as Thomas Cole and Albert Bierstadt, were still working in the aesthetic
categories set out by Price and Burke. Both painting and descriptions of the American wild
landscape followed the aesthetic tradition and vocabulary set out in the eighteenth century–
the aesthetic appeal of wilderness was understood in terms of the Picturesque and the
Sublime (wilderness was generally not thought of as beautiful in Burke's "smooth" sense).
5

(Nash 2001, p.73-84)
Since the aesthetic appeal of wilderness was understood in these categories, our
original question now becomes "Why was pristine wilderness Sublime or Picturesque?" First,
we should note that untouched-ness is neither a necessary nor suf ficient condition for either
kind of aesthetic virtue. Titanic architecture can be sublime, rural scenes can picturesque, and
perfectly pristine swamps and grasslands could be neither. (As William Cronon notes, this is
one reason that neither sort of ecosystem was designated as wilderness until quite recently.
(Cronon 1996, p.6)) But there is a reliable association between these categories and the
pristine.
The association is twofold. First, the appreciation of the sublime and the pristine
"occurred at the point when an art shifted its appeal from reason to the imagination." (Hussey
1967, p.4) An aesthetic that was based on the understanding and reason, where beauty came
out of moral truths and orderly proportion, so long as it also subscribed to the "long Western
tradition of imagining wild country as a moral vacuum, a cursed and chaotic wasteland" (Nash
2001, p.24), could find neither order nor morality in wilderness, and thus no beauty. Only
things that bore the mark of human improvement could ful fill these criteria. An aesthetic
based on the non-rational, however, opened up the possibility of aesthetic enjoyment excited
by landscape that had not been shaped by rational, human hands.
Second, the sublime and the picturesque have connections to unimproved landscape.
The sublime invoked the power of nature, indomitable peaks wreathed in fierce storms–
inspiring terror in the viewer at her own insigni ficance. Obviously, landscapes that do not bear
the mark of human industry have an advantage in evoking this–a chairlift on the indomitable
peak makes it domitable. The sublime, if it was effective, was simply too powerful and
inhospitable to show the mark of human effect.
The picturesque, though often associated with partially wild rural landscapes and ruins,
also has connections to pristine wilderness. Its characteristic feature was its irregularity,
roughness, and contrast. Formally speaking, one of the things that humans tend to do when
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"improving" a landscape is to smooth out such irregularities. Roads are made level, fields are
planted in rows, buildings are made square–in general, the scene moves from the picturesque
to the beautiful. The arti ficial, smooth lake at Hetch Hetchy replaced an irregular canyon.
Pristine nature, wilderness, tends to preserve the sorts of contrast and roughness
characteristic of the picturesque, and is thus one way that people might find the wilderness
beautiful.
Thus we have an account of how preserving the pristine nature of wilderness might be
understood to preserve its beauty. But the cracks in this connection already show. Not all
untouched nature is beautiful; there's no hard and fast reason that human affected
landscapes can not be sublime or picturesque. And, this understanding of aesthetics is highly
speci fic and contingent on a particular time and place–it does not exhaust the possibilities of
beauty. There may sometimes be a connection between the two, but pristineness is neither
necessary nor suf ficient for beauty.

1.2.2.2 Spiritual
In the previous section, we looked at the sublime as a purely aesthetic category. But
there is more to it than that. The powerful and the in finite–towering mountains wreathed in
storms–were held to be valuable because they reminded the viewer of the power and in finity
of God. The terror invoked by the sublime landscape was divine terror, a reminder of mortal
fragility in the face of God's creation. As Cronon puts it:
In the theories of Edmund Burke, Immanuel Kant, William Gilpin, and others,
sublime landscapes were those rare places on earth where one had more chance
than elsewhere to glimpse the face of God… Although God might, of course,
choose to show Himself anywhere, He would most often be found in those vast,
powerful landscapes where one could not help feeling insigni ficant and being
reminded of one's own mortality. (Cronon 1996, p.10)
Wilderness, then, is thought to be valuable because the aesthetic experience of landscape
that it involved was also a spiritual experience of landscape–wilderness was valuable
because it was beautiful, and beautiful because it was an experience of the divine. This was
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frequently understood in contrast to the more secular values evoked by civilized landscape,
as evidenced in Muir's quote: "These temple destroyers, devotees of ravaging
commercialism, seem to have a perfect contempt for Nature, and instead of lifting their eyes
to the God of the Mountains, life them to the almighty Dollar." (Muir 2010, p.261-62)
But, the sublime was not the only spiritual value found in nature. For the
Transcendentalists–Emerson, Thoreau, Muir, and others–"a correspondence or parallelism
existed between the higher realm of spiritual truth and the lower one of material objects. For
this reason natural objects assumed importance because, if rightly seen, they re flected
universal spiritual truths." (Nash 2001, p.85) This is similar to how Lynn White characterizes
the early Church's relationship to nature. "But since God had made nature, nature also must
reveal the divine mentality… In the early Church… nature was conceived primarily as a
symbolic system through which God speaks to men: the ant is a sermon to sluggards; rising
flames are the symbol of the soul's aspiration." (White 1967, p.5) For both Emerson and
Thoreau, this correspondence of natural facts with higher truths is the source and possibility
of language and art: "He would be a poet who could impress the winds and streams into his
service, to speak for him; who nailed words to their primitive senses, as farmers drive down
stakes in the spring, which the frost has heaved; who derived his words as often as he used
them…" (Thoreau 1862)
As noted in the previous section, the sublime has a particular connection to the the
pristine. Thoreau's sentiment on top of Katahdin–"It was vast, Titanic, such as man never
inhabits." (Thoreau 1864, p.640)–would hardly be possible in the presence of established
hiking trails worn by throngs of eager peak-baggers. In order for nature to symbolize the
in finite majesty of the divine and the fragility of mortals, it has to be unobscured by the works
of mortals. But, the less dramatic spiritually symbolic value of nature also relies on
pristineness. If one was trying to learn about the Creator from studying creation, then of
course the best site for this endeavor would be nature that was in a state as close as possible
to how it was created. That is: pristine wilderness. "[W]ilderness, as pure nature… [was] the
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clearest medium through which God showed His power and excellency. Spiritual truths
emerged most forcefully from the uninhabited landscape, whereas in cities or rural
countryside man's works were superimposed over those of God." (Nash 2001, p.46)
However, this understanding of the spiritual value of nature relies on a certain–
generally transcendentalist–understanding of spirituality. This understanding is not universal.
People certainly do have spiritual experiences in disturbed natural areas. Again, there may be
a connection between pristine nature and spirituality, but this is neither a necessary nor
suf ficient connection.

1.2.2.3 National Character
The idea of wilderness, especially wilderness preservation, has a particularly American
resonance. It has often been argued that the distinctive character of American institutions and
culture are due to contact with wild land, and thus that preserving wilderness would preserve
the national character. Gertrude Stein, for example, said that "In the United States there is
more space where nobody is than were anybody is. That is what makes America what it is."
(Stein 2013, p.17-18) The connection between American identity and wilderness is
complicated, but can usefully be divided into two senses. Both can be connected to the
pristine character of wilderness; thus, preserving pristine wilderness preserves American
national character.
The first connection comes from the American search for national pride following
independence, especially the search for some way in which the new nation might get a leg up
on the old and culturally developed powers of Europe. "Creation of a distinctive culture was
thought to be the mark of true nationhood. Americans sought something uniquely 'American,'
yet valuable enough to transform embarrassed provincials into proud and con fident citizens."
(Nash 2001, p.67) The nascent culture in the former colonies greatly lagged behind that of
long-settled Europe, but "in at least one respect Americans sensed that their country was
different: wilderness had no counterpart in the Old World." (Nash 2001, p.67) Thus, the very
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lack of development of the continent came to be a point of pride in American uniqueness.
This pride in the unspoiled state of the country is obviously connected to pristineness.
The difference with Europe, here, was speci fically that the American landscape did not have a
long history of (what the European colonizers thought of as) civilization. If the whole country
were to be tamed and remade to suit Euro-American needs, it would just be another Europe,
only without the castles or history. Preserving wilderness in its pristine state, then, was seen
as preserving one of the unique and irreplaceable features of the nation.
Wilderness was also seen to have an effect on the society and institutions of America.
This was a large part of Frederick Jackson Turner's thesis in The Frontier in American History.
"This, at least, is clear: American democracy is fundamentally the outcome of the experiences
of the American people in dealing with the West. Western democracy through the whole of its
earlier period tended to the production of a society of which the most distinctive fact was the
freedom of the individual to rise under conditions of social mobility, and whose ambition was
the liberty and well-being of the masses." (Turner 2008, c.IX) Open space and "free" land
(again, ignoring the original inhabitants), where people had the opportunity to make a place
for themselves through their own efforts, served to promote equitable and merit-based
distribution of resources, and provided an open space in which people could break out of old
patterns of social organization and begin a new society. "Western democracy has been from
the time of its birth idealistic. The very fact of the wilderness appealed to men as a fair, blank
page on which to write a new chapter in the story of man's struggle for a higher type of
society." (Turner 2008, c.IX)
Related to this is the idea that the wilderness of the frontier shaped the characters of
the pioneers in ways that were conducive to the flourishing of democracy. "Turner believed, in
short, that democracy was a forest product. Living in the wilderness, 'the return of primitive
conditions,' fostered individualism, independence, and con fidence in the common man that
encouraged self government." (Nash 2001, p.146) Thus, the character of the society–
encouraging equity and merit over oligarchy–and the character of the citizens–encouraging
10

independence, creativity, and vigor–were positively affected by contact with wilderness, and
this is what gave American society its distinctive virtue. Naturally, if this were true, the
disappearance of the frontier would be a serious threat to American culture, and the
preservation of wilderness would be one way to preserve something of the frontier character.
"Thus, in the myth of the vanishing frontier lay the seeds of wilderness preservation in the
United States, for if wild land had been so crucial in the making of the nation, then surely one
must save its last remnants as monuments to the American past-and as an insurance policy
to protect its future" (Cronon 1996, p.8)
The importance of preserving wilderness for shaping society and citizens was also
understood in terms of its untouched nature. First, it was an attempt to preserve a piece of the
frontier past. Since we're trying to recreate the virtues of our forbearers that came out of their
encounter with wilderness, it is important that we preserve wilderness in the state that they
encountered it. Wilderness preservation, then, is understood as the preservation of an
historical baseline. "Public wilderness areas are essentially a means for allowing the more
virile and primitive forms of recreation to survive the receding economic fact of pioneering."
(Leopold 1925, p.79) Second, one of the primary characteristics of wilderness that had a
salubrious effect on American society was its "blankness," its lack of human cultural footprints
that let the idealistic pioneers break the patterns of Old World monarchy and establish a new
democracy. "Indeed by virtue of being wild, the New World was a clean slate to which
idealists could bring their dreams for a better life." (Nash 2001, p.146) While people can not
literally begin new societies within designated wilderness areas, they do serve the function of
providing a non-cultural space were people can escape and think new thoughts. In order for
there to be this kind of blankness, wilderness needs to not only lack inhabitation, but also not
show the impact of human works.
The connection between national character and pristineness relies on an
understanding of pristineness as ahistorical blankness that ignores the presence of Native
Americans. If the settling of the frontier is understood instead as a conquest and a
11

colonization of already inhabited lands, then the pristineness of the these lands is
questionable, as is the value of preserving the “virtues” of the colonizers.

1.2.2.4 Health
Wilderness has often been linked to vitality. Theodore Roosevelt touted wilderness
experience as promoting "that vigorous manliness for the lack of which in a nation, as in an
individual, the possession of no other qualities can possibly atone." (Roosevelt 1926, p.xxxi)
Thoreau recommended that "If you would get exercise go in search of the springs of life.
Think of a man’s swinging dumb-bells for his health, when those springs are bubbling up in far
off pastures unsought by him." (Thoreau 1862, p.3)
One way to understand the sort of vitality supposed to be inculcated by wilderness
experience is in terms of evolutionary adaptation. Humans evolved physiologically and
psychologically to survive in conditions much like wilderness, and not in the highly
industrialized environment of modern life. Thus, periodic returns to wilderness areas would
perhaps allow a return to a more "natural" and healthy state. Inherent in this idea is the
connection to the past, a return to the world as humans first encountered it; this has
connections to the pristine.
In terms of physiology, this is not hard to see. Wilderness excursions generally involve
the sort of exercise that our bodies evolved to require in order to function well. Humans crave
fat, sugar, and salt. In a relatively sedentary environment, this urge can result in various
health problems. Strenuous physical activity in the back country, however, burns up large
amounts of calories, and sweating depletes electrolytes. These conditions–exercise and
perspiration–are more similar to the conditions for which our desires evolved, so that what
one wants to eat and what one should eat are more in harmony in wilderness, improving
health.
Suf ficient, regular sleep is important for mental and physical health. This can be
problematic in a society with night shifts and electric lights. "In other words, people in the
12

modern world not only get light during the night, they get far less light during the day inside
electrically lit buildings. This can lead to circadian confusion and de-synchronization of the
rhythms throughout the body." (Richards and Zhu 2015, p.3) There has also been research
indicating that disrupted circadian rhythms are associated with higher risk of cancer.
(Richards and Zhu 2015, p.4) Subjects who spent two weeks camping in Colorado without
electric light–that is, under conditions similar to human prehistory–showed normalization of
circadian rhythms. (Wright et al. 2013)
Recent research has suggested that the increasing prevalence of auto-immune
disorders and allergies may be the result of a lack of exposure to the parasites and
microorganisms in whose presence our immune system evolved: the "old friends" thesis.
Exposure to parasitic worms has been shown to be bene ficial to asthma sufferers. (Rook et
al. 2003) Exposure to wilderness conditions might include bene ficial exposure to such
microorganisms.
The principle is similar in psychology. We evolved under different social conditions
than the ones we currently live under. As Nelson puts it: "...Sigurd Olson, Robert Marshall,
and even Sigmund Freud have argued that civilization represses, frustrates, and often breeds
unhappiness and discontent in humans that can best be alleviated by periodic escape to what
they took to be wilderness." (Nelson 1998, p.11) Humans evolved living in small, closely knit
bands. The suite of emotional responses that developed under these conditions are
sometimes ill suited to life lived amongst throngs of anonymous strangers in modern cities.
Entering wilderness with a small group could recreate the sorts of social conditions for which
we are adapted. Research on the rise in developmental disorders in children that have little
contact with the natural world (Louv 2008) and the bene fits of wilderness exposure for
psychiatric patients (Lowry 1974) support this connection.
Pristine environments are neither suf ficient nor necessary for health. Returning to a
wilderness will bring what we should do for health more in line with what we tend to do, but
one could imagine any number of human-made environments where this is also true–sleeping
13

on a rooftop would wake one up with the sun, agricultural labor would burn calories, and
children could bene ficially play in forests of invasives. And, it is of course possible to get sick
or injured in the wilderness. Still, it might be argued that land unaltered by humans would
provide the most thorough similarity to the conditions for which humans evolved, and thus the
most health bene fits.

1.2.2.5 Ecological Value
One of Aldo Leopold's arguments for the preservation of wilderness areas is that land
science needs them for the same reason medical science needs healthy people: as an
example of normal functioning. "According to Leopold, wilderness areas serve as a measure
'of what the land was, what it is, and what it ought to be,' providing us with both an actual
ecological control sample of healthy land and a normative measure of what we ought to strive
toward." (Nelson 1998, p.17) That is, we can not gauge the effects that people have had on
an area if we don not have a relatively unaffected area with a similar climate to compare it to.
The idea that pristine wilderness is the norm of land health implies that it is functionally
optimal. Leopold's assumption seems to be that, due to evolutionary adaptation to climate,
wild ecosystems will be maximally ef ficient in terms of diversity, productivity, stability,
resilience, water filtration, carbon fixing, erosion prevention, and so on. Wilderness areas are
valuable both because they provide these functional characteristics, and because they
provide a standard by which to measure the functional characteristics of human-affected
lands. They might also provide information about how to improve the functioning of
humanized landscapes–agriculture in dry areas might imitate some of the ecological
structures that improve water retention in deserts, for instance. "The whole object of
conservation is, of course, to emulate nature's successes; this is not to make tamed land wild,
but to make subnormal land normal." (MacKaye 1950, p.243)
Wilderness as an ecological baseline provides data for how an area of land "should
be." If we are trying to manage for historical fidelity (one of the management goals of the the
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National Park Service is to maintain the "natural condition" of parks, "used here to describe
the condition of resources that would occur in the absence of human dominance over the
landscape" (NPS 2006, p.46), wilderness can serve as a proxy that tells us what the "natural
condition" of an area looked like, what species lived there and how they interacted.
It is both necessary and suf ficient that a wilderness area be pristine in order for it to be
able to be used as a proxy for untouched nature. Questions might arise about how untouched
an area has to be–completely or just the best available sample–in order to be used in such a
way, but, as long as we don not let the perfect be the enemy of the good, this is not be a
serious problem for management.
There are a number of presumptions about ecology inherent in the idea that may
cause trouble, however. Leopold's "health" idea seems to assume that pristine nature is
functionally and compositionally optimal; it's as diverse as possible, as productive as possible,
etc. These assumptions might not always be true–novel ecosystems might be better at fixing
carbon than native ones, for instance. Further, the health idea assumes that there is a single
"natural" state, or at least a historical range of variability, for an area. The advent of nonequilibrium dynamics in ecological theory raises questions about this assumption. And, the
value of a historical baseline in a world with a drastically altered climate is called into
question.
However, it does seem true that pristineness and biodiversity go hand in hand. Unless
humans genetically engineer new species, the only possible effect of human interaction on
biodiversity is negative, at least on non-geologic time scales. Preserving areas in their
historical baselines will preserve the species that historically lived there.

1.2.2.6 Recreation
Recreation is one of the values of wilderness that is most often talked about.
Recreation value is perhaps best understood as mixing the other values talked about already
into a unifying experience. A single backpacking trip involves exercise, sublime vistas,
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reconnecting to the human evolutionary past, immersion in an untouched ecosystem, and a
reminder of the national history of the frontier. Exemplifying this holism, Aldo Leopold
favorably compared the holistic character of the American hunting expedition into wilderness
via pack train to European hunting, in which the killing of the game was the sole recreational
objective. "…[O]ur test of skill is primarily the act of living in the open, and only secondarily
the act of killing game." (Leopold 1925, p.84)
If recreation value is an amalgam of other values, then its connection to pristineness
depends on the connections of these other values. However, if each of the individual values
that make up recreation are only partially connected to pristineness, but they tend to co-occur
in the presence of pristineness, then this seems to underscore the connection of recreation to
the pristine. Beauty and health bene fits occur in non-pristine areas. But, if recreation is better
in areas that have both, and pristine areas are more likely to have both, then the connection
to between recreation and the untouched is strengthened.

1.3 Wilderness and Environmentalism
Wilderness preservation has been considered one of the most important goals in
environmentalism, if not the goal of environmentalism. "The in fluential poet Gary Snyder, for
example, would like to see a 90 percent reduction in human populations to allow a restoration
of pristine environments, while others have argued forcefully that a large portion of the globe
must be immediately cordoned off from human beings." (Guha 1989, p.73)
One cause of the importance of wilderness preservation in American environmentalism
is due to the role wilderness historically played in the conservation movement. One of the
major sources that the American environmental movement grew from was concern over the
preservation of speci fic unspoiled places–Yosemite and the Hetch Hetchy dam controversy in
particular.
Another reason for the primacy of wilderness conservation in environmentalism is
theoretical. The biocentric perspective of Deep Ecology has been in fluential in
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environmentalism (or perhaps captured an intuition that was important already), and the
preservation of untouched wilderness is one of the most effective ways to preserve nature,
understood in terms of biodiversity, for its own sake, rather than for human interests.
Finally, the unifying power of the traditional concept of wilderness serves as an
argument for its primacy. As I have laid out in this chapter, wilderness seems to unite a large
number of the things that people value about the environment under one banner. Whether
one is interested in recreation, beauty, wildness, or a connection to America's frontier past,
wilderness preservation promises to achieve your goal.
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Chapter Two: Criticisms of Wilderness
2.0 Introduction
The traditional conception of wilderness has received an impressive amount of
criticism. In this chapter, I will examine some of the key critics of wilderness. There are two
questions brought up by criticism of wilderness. Should we abandon the idea of wilderness? If
not, how should we reconceive wilderness to deal with the problems raised? After answering
"no" to the first question in response to Callicott, from each other criticism I will draw a
desideratum for what a reconception of wilderness must include. I will lay out a reconception
based on these desiderata in chapter four.

2.1 Callicott: Should We Abandon Wilderness?
Unlike many critics of wilderness, who generally have problems only with aspects of
wilderness, J. Baird Callicott would like to do away with the concept of wilderness entirely,
though he takes pains to state that "I am as ardent an advocate of those patches of the planet
called 'wilderness areas' as any other environmentalist. My discomfort is with an idea, the
received concept of wilderness, not with the ecosystems so called." (Callicott 1991, p.339)
In "The Wilderness Idea Revisited," Callicott presents a three point critique of
wilderness, and recommends replacing it with an ideal of "sustainable development." Though
I, like Rolston in his response to Callicott, think "he is on the right track about sustainable
development and I readily endorse his positive arguments for developing a culture more
harmonious with nature"1 (Rolston 1991, p.367), I do not find Callicott's justi fication for the
abandonment of wilderness compelling. I will examine each of his three arguments in turn.
Callicott's first argument is that the concept of wilderness "perpetuates the preDarwinian Western metaphysical dichotomy between 'man' and nature, albeit with an
1 So long as “sustainable” is understood in environmental rather than economic terms.
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opposite spin." (Callicott 1991, p.348) That is, wilderness is based on preserving nature apart
from humans–preserving nature from humans–and this rests on a radical metaphysical
separation between humans and nature that has its roots in Descartes and Christian
theology. However, according to Callicott, an acceptance of Darwinian evolution undermines
the metaphysical distinction between "man" and nature.
If man is a natural, a wild, an evolving species, not essentially different in this
respect from all the others… then the works of man, however precocious, are as
natural as those of beavers, or termites, or any of the other species that
dramatically modify their habitats. And if entirely natural, then the works of man…
in principle may be, even if now they are usually not, bene ficial–judged by the
same objective ecological norms–to the biotic communities which we inhabit.
(Callicott 1991, p.350)
Wilderness rests on an ontological distinction between humans and nature; since this
distinction is false, wilderness does not make sense. More speci fically, because humans are
natural, human actions should be understood as of the same kind as the actions of animals
that alter their environment. Thus, human actions, including those in "wilderness," shouldn't
be understood as bad simply because they're human; they should, instead, be evaluated
based on their effects on the ecosystems affected. This is an argument against the value of
human non-intervention in nature.
The first problem with this argument is that Callicott is trading on the ambiguity
between two different senses of "natural"; nature as the world described by science, and
natural in distinction to culture. That is, because humans are not supernatural, there is no
distinction between nature and culture. However, even if we grant that there is no ontological
difference between humans and other animals along the lines of Descartes' substance
dualism, it does not follow that there is no morally relevant difference between them. In his
response to Callicott, Rolston plausibly locates such a difference in the ability of humans to
transmit information culturally and neurally rather than just genetically. (Rolston 1991, p.368)
Even if one does not endorse Rolston's location of the distinction, the impossibility of making
some such distinction does not follow from the fact that humans are the natural result of
evolution. Nor does it follow that because we are the same sorts of things as nature, we have
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no duties to avoid intervention in nature in some cases. Humans are the same sorts of things
as humans, but we do seem to have duties to sometimes refrain from interfering in other
humans' affairs, even when such interference would bene fit them.
It is also unclear what "objective ecological norms" Callicott would appeal to to
evaluate the effects of human actions on ecosystems. In "Current Normative Concepts in
Conservation," Callicott recommends ecological integrity as "the most comprehensive as well
as the most rigorous of current norms in conservation." (Callicott et al. 1999, p.25) Ecological
integrity–"native species populations in their historic variety and numbers naturally interacting
in naturally structured biotic communities.” (Callicott et al. 1999, p.25)–is synonymous with
pristineness. Thus, Callicott seems to be saying that the problem with wilderness is wildness–
avoiding intentional intervention–and that we should focus instead on pristineness. However,
his next two attacks on wilderness are attacks on the value of pristineness.
Callicott's second argument is that "the wilderness idea is woefully ethnocentric. It
ignores the historic presence and effects on practically all the world's ecosystems of
aboriginal peoples." (Callicott 1991, p.348) Something has to be pristine in order to be
wilderness; because of the effects of aboriginal peoples in changing the fire regime, their
ecological effects as an apex predator, and direct effects on the landscape from city-building
and path making, almost no areas of earth are pristine. Thus, there is no such thing a
wilderness.
There are two assumptions that Callicott makes about pristineness here. The first is
that, in order to be considered pristine, the baseline to which we compare the current state of
an area must be before any human effects. The second assumption is that that pristineness
must be absolute–that any deviation from the pre-human baseline destroys the pristine
character of a landscape. Neither of these assumptions is essential to pristineness as a value,
and neither seems to accurately characterize the position of wilderness advocates. We might
instead think of pristineness as a fidelity to conditions at some signi ficant point in history, even
if that involved humans. And, people do indeed seem to value wilderness that looks
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something like it did before European settlement, even if this is different than what the
landscape looked like before Native American settlement. We should also think of
pristineness as a more-or-less spectrum, rather than an either-or binary. The Bob Marshall
Wilderness was indeed profoundly affected by Native Americans, but it functions much more
like it did in the past than, say, downtown Manhattan now does. Thinking of pristineness this
way is a requirement for a sensible reconceptualization of wilderness, but this is not an
argument for abandoning the idea.
Callicott's third argument against wilderness is that "it ignores the fourth dimension of
nature, time. … trying to preserve in perpetuity–trying to 'freeze-frame'–the ecological status
quo ante is as unnatural as it is impossible." (Callicott 1991, p.349) Natural systems are
dynamic, they change. If we're trying to maintain an area so that it looks exactly as it did in
1492, we both won not likely be successful, and we'll have a human construct rather than a
natural system. "Designated wilderness areas, paradoxically, must be actively restored and
managed if they are to remain fit habitat for native species." (Callicott 1991, p.353)
This argument can be understood as a con flict between wildness and pristineness–
sometimes, in order to maintain one we have to compromise the other. That is, this is really
an argument against the view in the traditional concept of wilderness that wildness is
suf ficient for pristineness. It is true that this relationship does not always hold, and that we
frequently have to make a choice between the two. But, that we have diverse values in
wilderness, and that they sometimes con flict, is grounds for abandoning neither wildness nor
pristineness, but calls instead for elucidation of how to resolve con flicts when they arise.
Callicott's dualism argument is invalid. His argument that no wilderness is totally
pristine calls on us to avoid thinking of pristineness as an absolute. His argument that
wilderness ignores dynamic change highlights a flaw in the traditional understanding of
wilderness–wildness and pristineness sometimes con flict–but is not an argument against
either value. Callicott does point out some ways that we should avoid thinking about
wilderness, but does not provide suf ficient reasons to abandon the idea.
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2.2 Guha: Wilderness and Social Justice
In "Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation: A Third World
Critique," Ramachandra Guha presents several criticisms of Deep Ecology and its association
with wilderness preservation.
The first of these might be called the Imperialism Argument. Guha finds fault with the
tendency of Deep Ecology, and American Environmentalists in general, to equate
environmentalism with wilderness preservation, and to export this goal to areas of the world
where it is inappropriate. The centrality of wilderness in Deep Ecology is due to deep
ecologists' emphasis on the distinction between anthropocentric (protection of the
environment for their value as instruments to the satisfaction of human needs) and biocentric
(protection of natural things for their own intrinsic value, irrespective of human needs); for
Deep Ecology, wilderness protection is the most important form of environmental concern
because it protects nature for itself, rather than primarily for human use. However, Guha
claims that the anthropocentric/biocentric distinction, and the emphasis on wilderness that it
justi fies, is irrelevant to solving environmental issues that are of primary interest to those in
the Third World; locating wilderness at the heart of environmentalism results in these
concerns not being dealt with. "Until very recently, wildlands preservation has been identi fied
with environmentalism by the state and the conservation elite; in consequence, environmental
problems that impinge far more directly on the lives of the poor--e.g., fuel, fodder, water
shortages, soil erosion, and air and water pollution-have not been adequately addressed."
(Guha 1989, p.75)
In addition to shifting focus from the concerns of the poor, wilderness protection in
"long settled and densely populated" countries like India, "in which agrarian populations have
a finely balanced relationship with nature, the setting aside of wilderness areas has resulted
in a direct transfer of resources from the poor to the rich." (Guha 1989 p.75) The local
agrarian communities that have lived in and with the land have been displaced to make room
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for "pristine" nature reserves, and had their traditional use of the land curtailed in favor of the
interests of rich foreign tourists.
Guha highlights the way that wilderness conservation in the Third World has con flicted
with social and environmental justice concerns, and has actively harmed those least well off,
and least responsible for ecological degradation. If we are to save wilderness conservation,
we will need to, minimally, work out a way that it can be compatible with social and
environmental justice. Ideally, we might also develop an understanding of wilderness that
actually reenforces concern for justice. I will argue for a reconception of wilderness that does
both.

2.3 Guha and Cronon: Wilderness and Consumerism
Even in America, Guha sees Deep Ecology's focus on biocentrism and wilderness as
harmful in that it enables people to feel that they are preserving nature without examining
their own day to day lives of overconsumption–what we might call the Dualism Argument.
That is, rather than being a radical counterpoint to consumer society, wilderness and national
parks function merely as "a special institution within an industrialized society." (Guha 1989,
p.78)
Here, the enjoyment of nature is an integral part of the consumer society. The
private automobile (and the life style it has spawned) is in many respects the
ultimate ecological villain, and an untouched wilderness the prototype of
ecological harmony; yet, for most Americans it is perfectly consistent to drive a
thousand miles to spend a holiday in a national park. They possess a vast,
beautiful, and sparsely populated continent and are also able to draw upon the
natural resources of large portions of the globe by virtue of their economic and
political dominance. In consequence, America can simultaneously enjoy the
material bene fits of an expanding economy and the aesthetic bene fits of unspoilt
nature. The two poles of "wilderness" and "civilization" mutually coexist in an
internally coherent whole, and philosophers of both poles are assigned a
prominent place in this culture. (Guha 1989 p.79)
Guha is questioning both the supposed radicalism of wilderness preservation and its
ability to counteract the developed world's consumerist over-consumption that is the source of
most environmental problems–in practice it is merely another form of consumption rather than
a challenge to a lifestyle of over consumption.
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Guha's argument here is similar to William Cronon's argument that wilderness enables
escapism, and may have been the inspiration for it. Cronon argues that wilderness allows its
advocates to think of themselves as expatriates of the wild exiled to live in modern consumer
society, but with their "true home" in the wilderness. This allows wilderness advocates to
avoid taking responsibility for their everyday lives–driving hundreds of miles to visit wilderness
areas with expensive, state of the art camping gear made from petrochemicals. "Worse: to the
extent that we live in an urban-industrial civilization but at the same time pretend to ourselves
that our real home is in the wilderness, to just that extent we give ourselves permission to
evade responsibility for the lives we actually lead." (Cronon 1996, p.17)
How wilderness areas affect those who visit and advocate for them is an empirical
question. It is possible that wilderness areas function as a sort of specialized consumer
resource, and it is possible that wilderness experiences cause people to question their
everyday lives. However, that the concept of wilderness leaves this an open question is a
problem with the concept. If Guha is right that "overconsumption by the industrialized world
and by urban elites in the Third World" (Guha 1989, p.74) is one of the most important
environmental problems, and that consumerism is injurious to the good life (Borgmann 2012),
what we need is an understanding of wilderness that makes clear how wilderness can be a
counter to consumerism.

2.4 Marris: Problems With Pristineness
Emma Marris' Rambunctious Garden is a sustained attack on pristineness, the "correct
state, the holy baseline" (Marris 2013, p.24), as the default goal of all conservation efforts.
"This faith that native ecosystems are better than changed ecosystems is so pervasive in
fields like ecology that it has become an unquestioned assumption." (Marris 2013, p.14) The
problems that she finds with pristineness have important implications for how we think of
pristineness with regards to wilderness.
The first problem with pristineness is that it requires an historical baseline, a reference
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state with which to compare the current state of the system, and there are number of
problems regarding this baseline. The first is that there is no non-arbitrary point at which to
set it. It was generally thought that the conditions that obtained before European contact
represented a "balance of nature," the stable state that the ecosystem would naturally return
to. The first problem with this assumption is that local ecosystems were profoundly affected
by the non-European people that were already living there. For instance, if we're trying to
restore an area of Hawaii back to its pristine state, we might use 1777, the date Captain Cook
first landed, as the baseline. "But restoring the islands' ecosystems to the way they were in
1777 would be restoring them to a state very much shaped by the polynesians who had been
living there for at least one thousand years…" (Marris 2013, p.4) The second problem with
when to set the baseline is that "[e]cosystems are always changing, whether humans are
involved or not. … We are a short-lived species with a notoriously bad grasp of timescales
longer than a few of our own generations." (Marris 2013, p.4) That is, ecology has largely
moved past the "balance of nature" hypothesis; just because an area looked a certain way in
the past does not mean that it would look like that today if no humans had affected it.
"Ecosystems are fundamentally stable entities af flicted by changes from without and within
about as much as a ballet is a fundamentally static object af flicted with motion." (Marris 2013,
p.34)
The second problem with baselines is that we often don't know what ecosystems
looked like in the past. Captain Cook did not take a survey of the flora and fauna of Hawaii
when he landed. "Even when we use all the scienti fic tools available to look backward in time,
from fossil pollen records to the climate information enshrined in tree rings, we do not always
know what places looked like thousands or even hundreds of years ago." (Marris 2013, p.5)
Finally, it is often too dif ficult to preserve or restore an area in its baseline, especially in
an era of global climate change and ubiquitous invasive species. "We have de finitively
changed the entire planet, and it is getting increasingly dif ficult to undo all these changes at
any one place." (Marris 2013, p.5)
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The second problem with pristineness as the default goal of conservation is that, while
"putting things back the way they were' seems to handily cover any other goals we might
have" (Marris 2013, p.153), these other goals do not depend on pristineness. "We can cherish
evolution in action even if all the species struggling for existence are not 'native.' We can
protect ecological processes like soil formation and water filtration that bene fit us. We can
marvel at the diversity of life and fight its disappearance, even if that diversity occurs in
unfamiliar places. We can find beauty in nature, even if signs of humanity are present. We
can see the sublime in our own backyards, if we try." (Marris 2013, p.3) The importance of
this for wilderness is that many of the reasons that people value pristine wilderness turn out
not to depend essentially on pristineness.
One problem here is that Marris hedges on the difference between local and global
biodiversity. When she says that "With eight to eleven tree species per hectare, L.A. is more
diverse than many ecosystem types" (Marris 2013, p.151), what she fails to mention is that
while introducing non-native species might increase the diversity in a local area, if any of
these exotics drive a native species to extinction, then the global count of species has
dropped. Biodiversity does indeed depend very closely on pristineness.
There are real and serious problems with pristineness and the way that it functions in
the traditional wilderness concept. Marris points out that many of the various values
traditionally associated with pristineness do not actually depend on it, that pristineness is
often practically impossible to achieve, and that setting a baseline is supposed to be objective
but is not. However, there are still good reasons not to simply discard pristineness: people do
in fact value it, and it has important connections to biodiversity. We need to reevaluate what
pristineness is, and its centrality for wilderness.

2.5 Cole and Yung: The Dilemma of Wilderness Management
As we saw in section 1.2.1, in the traditional conception of wilderness pristineness and
wildness were seen as individually necessary and jointly suf ficient for wilderness, and that,
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due to the direct character of human effects on nature at the time the idea of wilderness was
formulated, as well as the in fluence of Clementsian climax ecology, wildness was seen as
leading to pristineness.
However, both the character of human effects on nature and our understanding of
natural systems have changed. As we saw in the last section, ecology has moved towards the
notion that "[t]here is no single 'natural condition' toward which the system would tend if left
alone." (Aplet and Cole 2012, p.19) This means that lack of intervention will not always lead to
a recovery of pristine historical conditions. Thus, "In altered ecosystems, neither historical
fidelity nor lack of human effect can be achieved without human control. Maintaining historical
ecosystems or keeping ecosystems on the trajectory they would be on in the absence of
human effects entails intentional and repeated human intervention." (Aplet and Cole 2012,
p.21) Sometimes, we're forced to choose between managing a wilderness for wildness or
pristineness: this is called "the dilemma of wilderness management."
In addition to the failure of the connection between wildness and pristineness, the
character of human effects on nature has changed. While the primary danger in the past was
direct, such as logging, development, or relatively local pollution, the most potent
contemporary human effects on wilderness are what Aplet and Cole call "ubiquitous and
directional human change." (Aplet and Cole 2012, p.23) This is human effects that are
omnipresent, indirect, and tend to move systems outside of their range of historical variability.
This includes widely dispersed invasive species, global climate change, pollution, and habitat
fragmentation. The upshot of the introduction of this sort of change is that it virtually
eliminates the possibly that non-intervention will result in a return to historical conditions. "In
the face of such pressure, recovery of historical conditions, unaided by human intervention, is
not likely to be effective, even where human in fluence was historically minimal; consequently,
the ideal approach to park and wilderness management is lost." (Aplet and Cole 2012, p.24)
If not only are wildness and pristineness not linked, but are often in con flict, and
wilderness has been traditionally de fined as land that is both pristine and wild, then we'll
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either have to say that wilderness no longer exists or we'll have to change the de finition.

2.6 Rewilded Wilderness
Elizabeth Kolbert describes the Oostvaardersplassen as "a wilderness that was also
constructed, Genesis-like, from the mud." (Kolbert 2012, p.50) The Oostvaardersplassen is a
fifteen thousand acre area in the Netherlands built on land reclaimed from the North Sea by
draining a shallow inlet, and designed to mimic what the local terrestrial ecosystem might
have looked like during the Paleolithic. Imported red deer, wild (really, feral) horses, foxes,
geese, and egrets populate the park. Since the Auroch–bos primienius–the wild ancestor of
the domestic cow and one of the major grazers of the Paleolithic, was hunted to extinction in
Poland in 1627 (Monbiot 2014, p.206), Heck cattle, bred to resemble their wild fore-bearers
by a pair of brothers in Nazi Germany have been introduced to the area. "Like genuinely wild
animals, those in the Oostvaardersplassen are expected to fend for themselves. They are not
fed or bred or vaccinated. Also like wild animals, they often die for lack of resources; for the
large herbivores in the reserve, the morality rate can approach forty per cent a year." (Kolbert
2012, p.55) Reintroduction of wolves is stalled by politics, but reserve managers are optimistic
that some will find their way in without assistance.
The Oostvaardersplassen is an example of "rewilding." The word has varied and
contested meanings, including the release of animals back into the wild, the restoration of wild
ecosystems, and the reintroduction of large carnivores. The sense that is most interesting for
our purposes is the one championed by George Monbiot in in Feral: "Rewilding, to me, is
about resisting the urge to control nature and allowing it to find its own way. It involves
reintroducing absent plants and animals… pulling down the fences, blocking the drainage
ditches, but otherwise stepping back. … Rewilding has no end points, no view about what a
'right' ecosystem or a 'right' assemblage of species looks like. It does not strive to produce a
heath, a meadow, a rainforest, a kelp garden, or a coral reef. It lets nature decide." (Monbiot
2014, p.9-10)
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Rewilded areas are clearly wild, but their relationship to pristineness is either
problematic or non-existent. What Monbiot advocates is to restore the elements that make
certain important ecological processes possible and then see what happens–he explicitly
avoids any connection to pristineness. Frans Vera, the architect of the Oostvaardersplassen,
does have the goal of restoring the ecosystem he thinks predominated in Paleolithic Europe.
This, however, seems more of a general model for what a truly wild landscape would look like
rather than a criterion for the success of the project. Since the area the Oostvaardersplassen
is built on was under the north sea, an historical ecosystem there would be aquatic.
Rewilded areas are plausibly and intuitively described as wildernesses: Kolbert does
so when she first introduces the Oostvaardersplassen. In highly developed areas like Europe,
rewilded areas might be the only direct relevance that the idea of wilderness conservation has
to most people's lives. However, they are wild and not pristine, and the traditional concept of
wilderness requires both. In our reconception of wilderness, we will need to find a way to
include rewilded areas as wildernesses.

2.7 Conclusion
Callicott points out some of the ways we should not think about wilderness, but is not
convincing that we should abandon the concept. Our approach should be to update the
concept. Guha's imperialism argument highlights the need for wilderness to be compatible
with social and environmental justice at minimum, and ideally supportive of justice. Guha's
and Cronon's dualism arguments highlight the need for wilderness to serve as a counter to
consumerism rather than simply a specialized recreation resource. Marris raises troubling
questions about the nature of pristineness and its role in conservation. Aplet, Cole and Yung
point out that changing human effects on nature and changing understanding of how
ecosystems work mean that we are often faced with a choice between wildness and
pristineness. Rewilded areas do not fit the classic de finition of wilderness, but should be
included. A revised conception of wilderness will have to satisfy all of these requirements.
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Chapter Three: Reconceptualization of Wilderness
3.0 Introduction
The concept of wilderness was a product of the time out of which it came. Times have
changed. We understand differently how nature functions. Our environmental concerns, and
the ways that we affect nature, have changed. The values that people found in wilderness still
exist, and it is possible for wilderness to address contemporary concerns. We should not give
up on wilderness; rather, we should update the concept to deal with our changed
understanding and current problems. I will propose such an updated conception in this
section.
Much of the problems that critics have found with the concept of wilderness have to do
with pristineness. My proposed reconception will involve changing how we think about
pristineness, and its primacy for wilderness. It is still valuable, but not necessary for
wilderness. This leaves wildness as the sole necessary condition of wilderness. We need to
justify this, and I will examine the value of wildness in the next chapter.

3.1 Revised Concept
The most important feature of my proposal to reconceive wilderness to change the role
of pristineness. (We also need to change how we think about pristineness; what constitutes it
and why it is valuable. This will be taken up in the next section.) Wildness should be thought
of as the only necessary feature of wilderness. Pristineness should be "demoted" to be one
among the various values that wilderness is held to have–beauty, spirituality, health, cultural
value, recreation, etc.–though pristineness is the most important of these. Enough of any
combination of these other values, combined with wildness, is suf ficient to make an area a
wilderness. There is no algorithm that speci fies how much wildness is needed, nor the
combination and amount of other values. This is inherently fuzzy, but comparison to examples
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of wilderness and assessments of how people interact with and value the area in question
can be used to make this judgement. Some compromising of wildness for the sake of
preserving pristineness or other values is possible, but pervasively human controlled areas
should be thought of as more akin to parks or gardens than wilderness.
Pristineness also needs to be understood as mostly independent of all of the various
values that it was traditionally taken to be the source of. As Marris points out, novel
ecosystems can be beautiful and spiritual, they can provide ecosystem services, recreation,
and health bene fits. Some of the cultural values identi fied with wilderness–cultivation of self
reliance, for instance–can be had from non-pristine wild ecosystems. However, global
biodiversity is tightly connected with pristineness, and pristine landscapes can be culturally
important in themselves.
Wildness and pristineness have to be seen as independent of each other. Refraining
from intervention will not necessarily result in maintenance of historical conditions. This is a
recognition of fact; ecosystems are not as stable as once thought, and human effects are
more broad scale than in the past. "[W]hen the Wilderness Act was drafted, there was an
expectation that wildness was conducive to naturalness, whereas it is now understood that
without active manipulation, natural areas are unlikely to conform to benchmarks of
naturalness." (Ridder 2007, p.8)
One consequence of this separation of wilderness from pristineness and pristineness
from (most) other values is that it undermines wilderness as the sole goal of
environmentalism because the various features that are valuable about nature are no longer
seen as dependent on pristineness. This addresses the requirement drawn from Guha that
wilderness should be, at minimum, compatible with environmental justice concerns–
wilderness advocates should understand wilderness protection as appropriate and important
in some contexts, but not always. How wilderness can aid justice will be discussed in chapter
4.
A major reason for reevaluating the role of pristineness is that it provides much greater
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flexibility for what counts as wilderness. Rewilded areas such as the Oostvaardersplassen, so
long as they are mostly wild and have enough beauty, recreation potential, etc., can be
considered wilderness. This recognizes landscapes that would intuitively be called wilderness
and allows the concept of wilderness to be relevant to people in areas with a longer history of
development, and, importantly, allows for the creation of wilderness in heavily humanized
areas.

3.2 Pristineness
In wilderness where pristineness is one of the major values, we need to rethink not just
the role of pristineness, but also its nature. The simplest way to do this is to think of it as a
continuum rather than a binary–an area can be more or less pristine by degrees, rather than
entirely soiled and fallen once it shows any human traces. Thus, even though most places in
the world were signi ficantly shaped by the people living there before Europeans showed up,
they were relatively pristine compared to areas more heavily altered by mechanized societies,
and this relative pristineness should be valued.
In part, this is what is meant by saying that pristineness is valuable but not necessary
for wilderness; we should value what is there, and possibly increase it though minimally
invasive intervention, but we should not require that wilderness be absolutely pristine. My
position is stronger than this, however. Though the Oostvaardersplassen is inspired by an
idea of what Paleolithic Europe was like, any reasonable baseline state for the area would be
an aquatic ecosystem. Thus, it is entirely non-pristine. But it should still be considered a
wilderness.
This does not solve the problem of when to place the baseline, however. As Emma
Marris brings up, setting a baseline is somewhat arbitrary. But, we can still have reasonable
guidelines that in fluence this choice. When to set baselines should be in fluenced by three
factors: pragmatism, biodiversity, and cultural signi ficance. Pragmatism is the most important
of these–setting a baseline that we do not have a good understanding of or cannot effect is
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pointless. Since biodiversity is one of the reasons that pristineness is valuable, we ought to
set baselines for periods when systems had maximal biodiversity. Another of the reasons that
pristineness is valuable is because of the connection between pristineness and culture. Many
threatened native species of Hawaii are mentioned in the "Kumulipo," native Hawaiians'
traditional genealogical chant, in which "plants and animals are named as ancestors of the
Hawaiian people. Thus native species are not just used to make culturally signi ficant objects
such as canoes or leis; they are family." (Marris 2013, p.168) European contact is another
culturally important marker. Arbitrariness only comes into play when these criteria con flict with
one another.

3.3 North Brother Island
New York City Council Member Mark Levine has advocated for 20-acre North Brother
Island the East River, just off the Bronx, to be a "'no-touch' and 'limited access' environmental
education destination, which would also allow a number of visitors to appreciates [sic] its
storied past." (Chung 2014) The island, once home to several quarantine hospitals and where
"Typhoid Mary" was housed for over 20 years, has been abandoned since 1963 (one of 13
abandoned islands under the jurisdiction of the NYC Parks Department). The island is
currently a bird sanctuary, off limits to the public. Photos of the island reveal a vibrant and
elegiac beauty–overgrown forest contrasts with decaying buildings overrun with vines.
While large wild landscapes like the Oostvaardersplassen seem to be clearly
wilderness, areas like North Brother Island might also be thought of, and managed for,
wilderness. It is certainly wild. It is more pristine than the Bronx, and the cultural signi ficance
of its history might justify setting a relatively recent baseline. As Levine describes it, it is
hauntingly, possibly spiritually, beautiful. The vine-covered ruins of quarantine hospitals is the
de finition of the Picturesque. "These ruins of the former hospital that have been overrun by
nature. The experience of being completely isolated in this forest with these half decayed
beautiful buildings as you faintly hear in the background the sounds of the city—honks from
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the Bronx, loudspeakers from Rikers…" (Chung 2014) Health bene fits might be somewhat
reduced due to air and light pollution from the city. It has recreation potential, though different
than that of larger wilderness areas. Though not the frontier, it provides a connection to the
past, and group identity. As Levine points out: "New Yorkers don't really think about how
we're on an island... we don't appreciate it." (Chung 2015) It's not perfect, but North Brother
Island has all of the values associated with wilderness. Though obviously the wilderness act
is inapplicable, many of the ways that it makes sense to care about wilderness apply to the
island.
In short, New York City has a wilderness area. That is, if it chooses to preserve it
rather than doing as Council Member Fernando Cabrera suggests: "I would like to have
Disneyland here.” (Foderaro 2015) Being able to apply the idea of wilderness, with all its
resonance, to debates like this is an argument for the value in reconceiving the idea.

3.4 What Is Left
We have not looked at the value of wildness, or justi fied its place as the sole necessary
condition of wilderness. We have also not shown how wilderness can be conducive to justice,
or a counterforce to consumerism.
The distinction between wildness and pristineness is predicated on a distinction
between intentional human effects on nature, such as road building, and unintentional effects,
such as the accidental introduction of exotic species. Without this distinction, except for
dramatic natural shifts in ecosystems over time, this would make any deviation from an
historic baseline also a reduction in wildness. This would resolve the dilemma of wilderness
management in favor of pristineness in nearly all cases, such that human intentional
intervention in order to control invasive species or mitigate the effects of climate change
would be the clear choice. If we want to defend the value of non-intervention, we need to
defend the distinction between intentional and unintentional effects.
These questions can be addressed by looking at wildness. I will do this in the next
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chapter.
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Chapter Four: Epistemic Wildness
4.0 Introduction
The idea of wilderness came about in order to deal with the environmental problems of
the time when it was formulated. Changing times necessitate a change in how we think of
wilderness. De-emphasizing pristineness resolves some of the problems with wilderness. But,
we still need to show how what has been proposed as the sole necessary component of
wilderness–wildness–is able to address contemporary concerns effectively. Explicating the
nature and value of wildness is a major part of justifying the reconception proposed in the last
chapter.
In the academic literature dealing with the problems faced by professional wilderness
managers, wildness is usually conceived exclusively in terms of intentional human control of
nature. This is indeed how one manages for wildness. However, it does not account for the
full value of wildness. In addition to what we might call "pragmatic wildness," the quality of
things that exceed human control or manipulation, many philosophers have discussed what
might be called "epistemic wildness," the quality of things that exceed human knowledge or
representation. Much of the value of wildness is found in epistemic wildness, including how
wildness can address some of our most important contemporary environmental concerns.
In this chapter I examine wildness. I first look at thinkers who have talked about
epistemic wildness, then present an account of it in terms of representation, and its
relationship to pragmatic wildness. Finally, I show how epistemic wildness can address justice
and consumer culture.

4.1 Thinkers on Epistemic Wildness
Many philosophers have examined and defended the value of wildness. Many of the
defenders of wildness have talked about it in terms of of epistemic wildness, though they have
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often not distinguished this from pragmatic wildness. How we make conceptual distinctions
depends in large part on the problems that we are trying to address, and epistemic and
pragmatic wildness are closely related, so failure to distinguish between them is not a
problem in many cases. However, in the context of wilderness, talking about wildness solely
in terms of pragmatic wildness fails to account for the full value of wildness, so this distinction
is important. In the context of our current project, there are three questions to ask of each
author. What is wildness? Why is it valuable? And, how does the nature and value of wildness
relate to how we know the wild?

4.1.1 Jack Turner
In De Ira, Seneca says that anger is "'a burning desire to avenge a wrong' or,
according to Posidonius, 'a burning desire to punish him by whom you think yourself to have
been unfairly harmed.' Some de fine it thus: 'anger is an incitement of the mind to damage him
who has done damage or wished to do damage.'" (Cooper 1995, p.19-20) Of course, one
might feel anger at wrong done to others, rather than just oneself. Which others? We can
identify this group with what Martha Nussbaum calls this group an individual's "Circle of
Concern," the people whose wellbeing is part of one's own scheme of goals and ends. This
generally includes friends and family, and might be extended to local and national group
identities, or even global concern for humanity, such that one would become angry when
anyone in these groups is wronged. (Nussbaum 2013)
Jack Turner's project in "The Abstract Wild" is to call attention to the fact that one of the
central reasons that environmental activism is ineffective is that real activism requires anger:
"effective protest is grounded in anger, and we are not (consciously) angry. Anger nourishes
hope and fuels rebellion, it presumes a judgment, presumes how things ought to be and
aren't, presumes a caring. Emotion remains the best evidence of belief and value." (Turner
1996, p.21-22) But, we do not get angry at the destruction of the environment. This is
because wild nature is outside our circle of concern, and this is because we have lost contact
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with "real" wild nature, in favor of tamed, mediated simulacra of nature–what Turner calls the
"abstract" wild.
From this sketch, we already have an answer to the question of the value of wildness.
For Turner, the value of real wildness is that encounters with it are necessary to produce
emotional attachment to wild nature. If Turner, and Nussbaum, are correct, and successful
political action requires emotional commitment–requires that our circle of concern is involved
in some way–then encounters with the real wild are necessary to protect wild things. Because
"[t]he majority of people who feel anguish about whales have never seen a whale at sea,"
(Turner 1996, p.29) their sadness and anger are "the emotions of an audience, the emotions
of sad entertainment, and they will pass as quickly as our feelings about the evening news or
our favorite film," (Turner 1996, p.29) and this will not motivate the sort of sacri fice–giving up
free time to activism, accepting the inconvenience of boycotting products–that would be
necessary to actually protect them. Real wildness inspires emotional attachment, and this is
necessary for effective political action to protect the environment.
But what is wildness, and how does it foster emotional connection to nature?
Unfortunately, Turner does not answer this question explicitly. His notion of "the wild" is vague
and inclusive, covering both pristineness–the presence of non-indigenous golden trout count
against an area being truly wild–and wildness as lack of control–"the freedom that is the
promise of the wild." (Turner 1996, p.28) In trying to understand just what we need to
encounter in order to foster emotional connections to nature, what is most important in Turner
is the distinction between the real and the abstract wild, and the different ways that we come
to know them.
For Turner, the reason that the wild is not within our circle of concern is that we do not
actually know it. Such knowledge is experiential–it is gained from direct encounters with the
wild. "If anything is endangered in America it is our experience of wild nature—gross contact.
There is knowledge only the wild can give us, knowledge speci fic to the experience of it.
These are its gifts to us. In this, wilderness is no different from music, painting, poetry, or love:
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you concede the abundance and try to respond with grace." (Turner 1996, p.26) This is
contrasted with two ways that the wild is simulated. We might have direct experience with "a
severely diminished wilderness animal or place — a caricature of its former self. Or we have
extensive indirect experience of wild nature mediated via photographic images and the written
word." (Turner 1996, p.27) That is to say, we, living in contemporary technological society,
think that we have extensive knowledge of wild nature. But, most of our knowledge comes
from either media representations–"[w]e are deluged with commercial images of wildness:
coffeetable books, calendars, postcards, posters, T-shirts, and place mats." (Turner 1996,
p.27)–or contact with tamed and limited nature that we mistake for the wild, like seeing an
animal in a zoo, which Turner likens to a caricature of the real wild.
Real wildness is necessary for people to care about wild things. And, there is
something that we learn from direct experience of wild nature that we do not get from tame or
mediated nature, something that makes the former "really" wild. Turner does not say what this
is. Why is not a documentary about whales enough to establish a real emotional connection
to them? If Turner is right, we cannot hope to communicate the content that is missing, but an
account of epistemic wildness might at least characterize what sort of knowledge is missing
from mediated representations of nature, especially given the importance of the fact that
something is missing.

4.1.2 Robert Chapman
In “Ecological Restoration Restored,” Robert L. Chapman discusses wildness in the
context of a response to what he calls the paradox of restoration. If, following environmental
philosophers such as Eric Katz and Holmes Rolston III (Katz 1996, Rolston 1991), if we
equate wildness with wilderness, de fined as areas in which natural historical processes have
been able to operate untrammeled by human in fluence, then it becomes contradictory to
attempt to restore wildness through human intervention. As Chapman quotes Throop:
“Restoration may recover lost value by returning some of the original wildness. For example,
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a Yellowstone with restored wolves may be wilder than it was without them. This justi fication
confronts a serious paradox, however. 'Wildness' is typically de fined in terms of lack of human
alteration. If so, how can additional human alteration of an ecosystem involved in restoration
enhance wildness?” (Throop 2000, p.15) Chapman's solution is to draw a distinction between
wildness and wilderness.
Whereas wilderness is de fined by the wilderness act as areas where humans are
visitors that do not remain, Chapman's account of wildness draws on Leopold and Thoreau to
emphasize its essential connection to civilization and human activity. “Wildness is a catalyst
for originality; encounters with it are inspirational and culturally enriching.” (Chapman 2006,
p.467) What Chapman is talking about here might be called the progress of civilizations; the
founding of new political and social orders, and the overcoming of ossi fied and restrictive
ways of life. What allows humans to transcend old concepts in this way are confrontations
with wildness, because "… the wild speaks to the idea that there always remains a surplus
that escapes our categories and organizational practices, even as it is generated by them"
(Bennett 2000, p.xxi). Thus, “[c]ontact with wildness provides the inspiration for the
conceptual structure out of which civilizational and cultural change occur.” (Chapman 2006,
p.468)
So far, we have an account of wildness as valuable for allowing change in the
conceptual structures of civilization, and that wildness allows for this by somehow exceeding
these conceptual structures. This leaves unanswered questions. What is wildness itself? Is
this relationship to civilization all there is to wildness? How can we measure wildness such
that we can say that one thing is more wild than another? Why are natural things more wild
than human-made things?
In answering these questions, Chapman first emphasizes the “formidable obstacles of
such an undertaking.” (Chapman 2006, p.470) He quotes Aitken as saying that “… the notion
of wildness is not amenable to being precisely de fined, because it is an experiential
phenomenon.” (Aitken 2004, p.78) However, Chapman goes on to give a provisional working
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de finition of wildness. “Wildness is a natural qualitative source for endlessly adaptive
metaphors portraying dynamic, unlimited relationships between nature and culture.”
(Chapman 2006, p.471)
This de finition has some merits and some drawbacks. What is good about it is that it
gives us a measure by which to assess wildness: inspiration. Yellowstone with wolves
generates more metaphors, calls more concepts into question, than Yellowstone without
wolves, so that we could say that restoring wolves restores wildness. And, Chapman's
de finition draws attention to the value of wildness in culture. One thing that Chapman does
not mention here is that the value of wildness for culture presupposes a certain 'open'
relationship with the wild–we have to be willing to learn from wildness, rather than simply
ignoring it or trying to beat it into submission. The main problem with this is that it seems more
a measure than a de finition; it tells us that wild things are a source for metaphors, but does
not tell us why or how this is the case. It is also not exclusive; surely there are all sorts of
sources of metaphors, not only wild things. Further, the wording seems needlessly limited.
Why are only natural things wild? Why only metaphors rather than, say, models or concepts
or laws? Why must the metaphors only portray relationships between nature and culture?
So, for Chapman, the value of wildness is that contact with wildness can allow for
cultural change and progress. He de fines wildness relative to this value as a source of
inspiration. As Chapman makes explicitly clear, the sort of wildness he's talking about is not
(directly) the sort of pragmatic wildness considered by wilderness managers when they
consider whether to intervene in nature. Rather, wildness is how natural things exceed our
concepts, and thus allow us to transcend them. It is implicit, however, that this sort of
wildness is related to pragmatic wildness–uncontrolled things seem to be more inspiring than
tame ones.

4.1.3 Tom Birch
Thomas Birch, in “The Incarceration of Wildness” is opposed to those that view
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wilderness and wildness as synonymous. Birch views this traditional equivocation as an
attempt to get wildness under control. That is, what Birch thinks is absent from modern
Western society is precisely the open relationship to wildness that Chapman presupposed as
enabling civilization to overcome its old concepts. Rather, for Birch, legal designation of
wilderness areas is an attempt to make the system of concepts total and absolute; de fining
away wildness as wilderness.
This takes place in the context of society's relationship with otherness. And, “... the
essence of otherness is wildness.” (Birch 1990, p.450) In Birch's discussion of wildness as a
key feature of otherness, we can see two of the themes that were prevalent in Chapman;
wildness as essential for the progress of society, and wildness as what escapes de finition.
If any other is to preserve its (his, her) identity as other, as other in relation to
another person, society, species, or whatever, then it must at bottom resist
accepting any final identity altogether. An other cannot essentially be what it
is objecti fied, de fined, analyzed, legislated, or understood to be if it is to be
and remain an other. ... A finalization of the identi fication of the other is a (selfdeceived) absorption or ingestion of the other into the subjectivity of the self, or,
on the social level, into the "system." Such an absorption is also a finalization of
self or of system de finition that takes self or system out of the world into a state of
alienation. Self-becoming in and out of dialectical response to others and to
other-becoming is then no longer possible. … This is why wildness, which
contradicts any finalization in identi fication, is at the heart of otherness, as well, of
course, as at the heart of any living self or society. (Birch 1990, p.450)
That is, wildness, and otherness, consists in not being fully reducible to the concepts that are
applied to something. At a very basic level, this is what it means for something to be not
merely a projection of a self or social system. The fact that other people are more than just
what I think of them is a condition of their being other people and not just my own mental
constructs. There is more to my friends than is contained in my thoughts or concepts of them;
this is not true of imaginary friends. If an individual or society begins to take an other as fully
de fined by their representation–aside from this being a delusion–the ability to transcend,
amend or alter those representations and thus to grow is lost.
Unfortunately, this reduction of the other to its de finition is the whole project of Western
imperial civilization, according to Birch. At its base is an assumption about our relationship to
others: that they're our enemies. “The central presupposition is thus Hobbesian: that we exist
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fundamentally in a state of war with any and all others. This is perhaps the most central tenet
of our guiding mythology, or legitimizing story, about the necessary manner of relationship
with others.” (Birch 1990, p.447) Thus arises imperial power, in order to get the hostile other
under control. “The whole point, purpose, and meaning of imperial power, and its most basic
legitimation, is to give humans control over otherness.” (Birch 1990, p.458) There is a
pragmatic and an epistemic dimension to this imperial project; it achieves control both through
eradication and through conceptual reduction; we kill off anything that might disturb us, and
then retreat into a world of total control of pliant simulacra that are just what we de fine them
as. At their worst, this is what wilderness areas and national parks can be. By setting bounds
for wildness, parks and wilderness areas provide an excuse to pragmatically clamp down on
wildness that gets out of its bounds; the National Park Service killed 900 Yellowstone Bison in
2014, a fifth of the herd, because of fears that they'd leave the park in the winter (Zuckerman
2014). And, "of ficial" wilderness provides an image of nature that we can know fully; once
we've driven through Glacier National Park, purchased a plush Grizzly at the gift shop, we
think that we know what wildness is.
In contrast to this way of looking at wilderness preservation, Birch recommends an
approach based on recognizing wilderness as bastions of wildness, that might jolt us out of
our system of concepts. “The risk of the real is that in seeing the glance of the other, … in
attending to wilderness, one sees, or is likely to see, that the other is more than, other than,
independent of, the de finitions, models, and simulations that the imperium proposes as
exhaustive of it.” (Birch 1990, p.459) This is similar to both Turner and Chapman. The direct
contact with real wild things advocated by Turner allows us to see the shortcomings of our
concepts of them, calling those concepts into question, which allows for the sort of conceptual
re-assessment that Chapman thought necessary to progress.
So, we find in Birch further support for the idea of wildness as those features of objects
that are surplus to conceptualization, and for the position that coming to terms with wildness
and wild things is vital for civilization to progress. For Birch, however, the sort of open
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relationship that would allow us to approach wildness in a productive way, not simply as
something to be dominated and eliminated, is antithetical to the broad trend of the Western
cultural narrative. But, it is also wilderness approached as a non-hostile other that allows us to
overcome our cultural narrative of imperial power.
What is it about nature and wilderness that allows this? “Nature is wild, always wild, in
the sense that it is not subject to human control. In this sense, humans are participants in a
wildness that is far larger and more powerful than they can ever be, and to which human law
bringing is so radically inappropriate as to be simply absurd.” (Birch 1990, p.460-461)
Because it is vast and outside of our control, and frequently unexpected, nature constantly
reminds us of the limitations of our representations. If we think we know everything there is to
know about the weather, we will quickly be reminded that we do not. Human created things,
generally, are much more amenable to control, and so tend to remind us that they're more
than we think they are less insistently.
The value of wildness for Birch is that, by reminding us of the inadequacy of our
representations of others, encounters with wild things call the finality of these representations
into question. Since, according to Birch, the project of western imperialism is to get others
under control, wildness is thus a counter to imperialism. "When we see the real otherness that
is there beneath the imperium's version of it, beneath all the usual categories of use and
value, then we see an otherness that can never be fully described, understood, or
appropriated, and the entire edi fice of the imperium is called into question to such a degree
that it becomes practically necessary to resist and deconstruct it, because it so epitomizes
bad faith and delusion." (Birch 1990, p.460) Though physical human intervention and control
does result in a compromising of wildness for Birch, much of the importance and relevance of
wildness comes from it epistemic aspect–the chasm between our ideas about things and the
existent thing itself. It is also important that we have an "open" relationship to the other so that
we recognize and appreciate its wildness, rather than reacting with a will to control the other.
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4.1.4 Jane Bennett
Jane Bennett's project in Vibrant Matter is to provide a novel account of causality and
agency that moves the center of action away from the isolated human subject and towards
distributed assemblages of quasi-agentic vibrant matter. An essential component of her
account is what she calls thing-power, “...that which refuses to dissolve completely into the
milieu of human knowledge.” (Bennett 2010, p.3) For our purposes, Bennett's thing-power is
synonymous with wildness.
Part of how Bennett talks about wildness–thing-power–is as what our concepts fail to
capture, which was crucial but not explicitly discussed much in both Chapman and Birch. She
approaches this in several ways, comparing it to similar ideas from a number of thinkers. One
of these, “the absolute,” from political theologian Hent de Vries, “...tries to point to what no
speaker could possibly see, that is, a some-thing that is not an object of knowledge, that is
detached or radically free from representation, and thus no-thing at all. Nothing but the force
or effectivity of the detachment, that is.” (Bennett 2010, p.3) However, where de Vries is
talking about a limit to the knowledge of a human subject, Bennett is more interested in the
thing itself, and its capacity to act independently. Even when we're not looking, things have
“...the curious ability... to animate, to act, to produce effects dramatic and subtle.” (Bennett
2010, p.6)
The question of how we are able to encounter something that we, by de finition, cannot
know or experience naturally arises. Speaking of an encounter with a particular assemblage
of objects in a storm drain, Bennett notes that “[t]his window onto an eccentric out-side was
made possible by the fortuity of that particular assemblage, but also by a certain anticipatory
readiness on my in-side, by a perceptual style open to the appearance of thing-power.”
(Bennett 2010, p.5) There is an echo of Birch here, and the notion that we have to have a
certain openness to otherness in order for objects to become present to us in a way that
exceeds the ideas that we have of them. It would have been easy to look and see a collection
of easily dismissed trash, but a willingness to stop and consider things from a different
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perspective led Bennett to be astounded by the impossible particularity of that collection of
things in that particular place. Chapman, drawing on an earlier work by Bennett, says that we
meet the wild in uncanny experiences. “Uncanny experiences are clusters of the familiar and
the unknown, lurking in the shadows of an epiphany, pulling us from the comfort of our
habitual path. ” (Chapman 2006, p.468) We experience wildness when we encounter
something of which we have a familiar concept, but which is exhibiting some new, unfamiliar
aspect. The new aspect makes us aware of the inadequacy of the familiar concept. That is,
wildness is not an encounter with the thing-in-itself, but with aspects of the thing that could
have been conceptualized, but were not.
Bennett also draws on Theodore Adorno's “Nonidentity,” the gap between the thing
and its concept. “For Adorno, this gap is ineradicable, and the most that can be said with
con fidence about the thing is that it eludes capture by the concept, that there is always a
'nonidentity' between it and any representation.” (Bennett 2010, p.13) “Nonidentity is the
name Adorno gives to that which is not subject to knowledge but is instead 'heterogenous' to
all concepts.” (Bennett 2010, p.14) We are aware of this failure of our concepts, however, and
the discomforting experience of it is the source of our impossible demand for knowledge and
control over the world. Adorno's solution is to acknowledge and accentuate this experience in
order to “...stop raging against a world that refuses to offer us the 'reconcilement' that we,
according to Adorno, crave.” (Bennett 2010, p.14) This is also reminiscent of Birch–in an
encounter with wildness, we can either respond with a will to mastery, or an openness to the
limitations of our own control and understanding.
The value of wildness for Bennett is its connection to her ethical project. "The ethical
task here is to cultivate the ability to discern nonhuman vitality, to become open to it."
(Bennett 2010, p.14) Vitality in Bennett's sense might be described as teleological wildness.
Whereas de Vries and Adorno were talking about the gap between things and how we
conceptualize them, the emphasis in Bennett is on the gap between our purposes for things
and how they act. That is, we think of the components and the whole of the electrical grid in
49

terms of their purpose and functional roles, but they do not always act this way. There is more
to them than that, and this excess can sometimes result in unpredictable behavior. "[Thingpower] draws attention to an ef ficacy of objects in excess of the human meanings, designs, or
purposes they serve." (Bennett 2010, p.20) We might view this as the connection between
epistemic and pragmatic wildness–how our concepts allow us to control the world–but
Bennett's wildness is more than just non-intervention. Becoming open to and aware of
nonhuman vitality "may induce vital materialists to treat nonhumans–animals, plants, earth,
even artifacts and commodities–more carefully, more strategically, more ecologically."
(Bennett 2010, p.18) For Bennett, recognition of wildness inculcates a greater respect for the
non-human world.1

4.2 Wildness as Representation
Talking about the sort of wildness identi fied by Turner, Chapman, Birch, and Bennett in
terms of representation will, I hope, provide a clear and uni fied account of, and a useful
vocabulary for talking about, epistemic wildness.

4.2.1 Representation
What is a representation? Contrary to a naive view, resemblance is neither necessary
nor suf ficient for something to represent something else–a flag represents a country, but does
not look like it. Nelson Goodman, in Languages of Art, says that "Denotation is the core of
representation and is independent of resemblance." (Goodman 1968, p.5) Something, the
source, represents something else, the target, when the source denotes the target. The
intentionality and kind of denotation is generated by embeddedness within a symbolic system
for Goodman: "Nothing is intrinsically a representation; status as a representation is relative to
symbol system." (Goodman 1968, p.226) That is, whether a work is a representation or a
1 I have not discussed the parts of Bennett's work that I do not find compelling, and have shifted emphasis to the
parts that I do. She presents a nuanced and insightful account, and a worthy critique is beyond the scope of the
current project. Brie fly, I believe that she endorses a form of panpsychism–equating agency with ef ficacy–that is
insuf ficiently justi fied, and raises more problems than it solves.
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description depends on artistic and linguistic convention, not on the intrinsic features of the
work itself.
Though it is better than the resemblance view and solves many of the problems of
representation in art, Goodman's account is focused on artistic representation, and as such
does not include things like descriptions or certain kinds of mathematical models as
representational. It also would have trouble dealing with things like idiosyncratic
representations not part of conventional symbolic systems–drawings by children unschooled
in the conventions of art, for instance, are not clearly representational–and this complicates
any account of mental representation.
Bas van Fraassen, in Scienti fic Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective, provides a
broader account that is more useful for our purposes. He takes as the Hauptsatz of his
account of scienti fic representation: "There is no representation except in the sense that some
things are used, made, or taken, to represent some things as thus or so." (van Fraassen
2010, p.16) Whether something is a representation is determined by how it is used–but what
is it to use something as a representation? "[S]cienti fic representations must allow us to go
reliably from what we know to what we will or can encounter further on." (van Fraassen 2010,
p.191) A model of a plane in a wind tunnel allows us to draw conclusions from the features of
the model about features of the plane that is represented. The intentionality of the
representation, and which features of the target are represented, depend on use as a
representation, and this use depends on the ability to draw conclusions from the
representation about the represented. Though phrased in terms of the scienti fic, this account
is general enough to include most of the ways that we usually talk about representation.
The existence and nature of mental representations is controversial. Some (Millikan
1984, 1989, Dretske 1994, Tye 2002) have argued that representation is essential to mental
content or intentionality. Others question the centrality of this role (Dreyfus 1991, Searle
1995), or question the existence of mental phenomena taken to be representational (Dennett
1989, Stich 1983). van Fraassen says that he "will have no truck with mental representation,
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in any sense." (van Fraassen 2010, p.II) Though, contrary to his own statement, I think that
functionalist accounts of mental representation are quite compatible with van Fraassen's
Hauptsatz ("…what makes a thing into an inner representation is, near enough, that its
function is to represent." (Milikan 1989, p.282)), for our purposes it is not necessary to
endorse a comprehensive theory about what constitutes a mental representation, or a theory
that accounts for all mental phenomena in terms of representation. All we need to usefully talk
about mental representation is that there exist some mental phenomena that are taken or
used as representations. This limited claim is relatively uncontroversial, and seems intuitively
plausible.
Though the issues surrounding mental representation are complicated, we can give
one simple argument that there are such things, at least as far as our purposes go.
Representation depends on use, and this involves drawing conclusions from the features of
the source to features of the target. A mental model can serve this function, and indeed can
substitute for a physical model that would be considered representational. For example,
shifting a cumbersome couch in the imagination can be used as a substitute for rotating a
physical model when trying to find out how to move furniture through tight spaces. Since they
have similar uses, and representation depends on use, the mental model should also be
considered representational.

4.2.2 The Representational De ficit
To begin to talk about representation and wildness, we can note that for both van
Fraassen and Goodman, representation is always representation as. "…[T]o represent
something is to represent something thus or so." (van Fraassen 2010, p.21) "In other words,
nothing is ever represented either shorn of or in the fullness of its properties. A picture never
merely represents x, but rather represents x as a man or represents x to be a mountain, or or
represents the fact that x is a melon." (Goodman 1968, p.9) For van Fraassen, this
representation as often trades on selective resemblance or likeness. "For there is no point in
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emphasizing that science presents us with representations of natural phenomena, if not to
convey that success in science will consist in constructing an image of nature that is adequate
in certain respects and trades on resemblance at best in part, as opposed to constructing a
true and accurate copy." (van Fraassen 2010, p.187)
For our purpose, what is signi ficant about this is that both Goodman and van Fraassen
claim that representation is always representation as, and representation as is always partial.
It represents some features but not others. A representation that included all of the properties
of what it represented (if this were possible) would be a copy, not a representation. This is
also supported by Plato. In his eponymous dialogue, Cratylus is asked by Socrates if a god
"…copies all your qualities, and places them by you in another form; would you say that this
was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, or that there were two Cratyluses?" To this Cratylus
admits that this would be another Cratylus rather than a representation. (Reeve 1998, 423a-d)
Any representation represents some characteristics of what it denotes and not others.
A road atlas will represent the highways and surface roads of an area but not the hydrology,
population density, or topography. Political cartoons represented Franklin D. Roosevelt as
cutting the rope labeled "Supreme Court" holding America above the abyss of despotism, or
as a giant casting the corrupt moneychangers out of Wallstreet, but they commonly did not
represent him as disabled. An astrophysics graduate student once told me that a common
practice within the field, when astrophysicists needed to model human beings, was to
represent them as spheres of water one meter in diameter. No representation is "complete,"
there are always features of the target that could be represented, but are not.
We do not need direct contact with the "thing itself" to understand that there's always
something left out of our representations. We know this inductively from observing that there
is always one more thing that could be represented, but is not.
I call the features of the target that are not captured in a representation of it the
representational de ficit. This goes a long way toward explicating epistemic wildness as the
gap between representations and what they represent–there's always more to the thing than
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is contained in the representation.

4.2.3 Signi ficance
However, the existence of a representational de ficit is not suf ficient for epistemic
wildness. Any target of representation has an arbitrarily large set of features that the
representation leaves out. If this were all that were needed for epistemic wildness, everything
in every situation would be equally wild–desks and soft drinks would be as wild as people and
Grizzly bears–and this is not how we use the term wild. In order for something to be
epistemically wild, the representational de ficit has to be signi ficant or important in some way.
Another way of saying this is that epistemic wildness shows up when we find a representation
to be inadequate; when we notice that there's more to the thing than is contained in the
representation. This way of talking about wildness is in line with Aitken's statement that
wildness is an experiential phenomenon; wildness happens when we experience a
representational de ficit as important. 2 Chapman and Bennett's characterizing the experience
of wildness as uncanny also makes sense here; wildness combines the familiar, what is
contained in our representation, with becoming aware of the unfamiliar aspects that were left
out of the representation.
In order for the representational de ficit to show up as signi ficant, there are two basic
requirements on the user of the representation. The first is attentiveness: one has to be
paying enough attention to the thing represented to notice that it has features not contained in
the representation. Attention is a strange phenomenon. It can be directed to some extent, but
quite often our attention is "grabbed" by things, outside of the direction of the conscious ego.
The second is openness: one has to be willing to not immediately dismiss the de ficit once it
comes to attention. It is impossible to give a rigid and comprehensive account of which
situations will have these two features, and thus we cannot say with any great precision when
2 When we speak of epistemic wildness as a property of an object–“x is epistemically wild”–this is short hand for “x has
features that make it likely to produce experiences of epistemic wildness. Everything has the potential to evoke
experiences of epistemic wildness, but not everything is equally disposed to do so.
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something is going to be epistemically wild.
We can give some examples of the sorts of situations that provoke wildness, though.
We will be more likely to pay close attention to things if they are important to us. One will be
more likely to notice that there is more to loved ones, or loved places, than was previously
thought. An encounter with a potentially dangerous animal is likely to make one pay very
close attention to the ways that models fail to predict its behavior. If a representation is
inadequate to its purpose the representational de ficit will also likely show up. In science, this
may take the form of anomalous results not predicted or accounted for by the model in use. In
everyday life this may take the form of discovering that a section of trail represented on a map
has become impassable. Using a representation for a purpose other than the one it was
intended for will also highlight its representational de ficit. Anyone using Google maps,
designed for towns and roads, to navigate a forest will notice how many features of the land
are left out of the representation. A scienti fic and a poetic description of the same meadow
will highlight different features; trying to extract the composition and structure of an ecosystem
from a poem, or the aesthetic impact from an ecological survey, will highlight what is left out
of each. Finally, one might also deliberately pay attention to the representational de ficit.

4.3 Epistemic and Pragmatic Wildness
Now that we have an account of epistemic wildness, we can talk about how this relates
to what I have called pragmatic wildness. Ned Hettinger and Bill Throop de fine and defend
pragmatic wildness as a value of natural systems. "As we use the term, something is wild in a
certain respect to the extent that it is not humanized in that respect. An entity is humanized in
the degree to which it is in fluenced, altered or controlled by humans." (Hettinger and Throop
1999, p.12) That is, pragmatically wild things are things over which humans do not have
practical, active mastery. Pragmatic wildness is an objective relational property, epistemic
wildness is a property of subjective experience. Hettinger and Throop give an excellent
defense of the value of pragmatic wildness as a sort of “root value” that makes other features
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valuable: “Biodiversity is not by itself valuable. If it were, we could add value to ecosystems by
integrating large numbers of genetically engineered organisms into them. But doing so seems
unacceptable. It is wild biodiversity that people wish to protect.” (Hettinger and Throop 1999,
p.14) Their account goes a long way towards justifying the value of wildness in wilderness,
but does not address epistemic wildness.
The practical and the epistemic ways of being wild are related, but conceptually
separable. Neither is a necessary or suf ficient condition for the other. It is easy to think of
examples where something is wild in one sense and not in the other. The meteorological
processes behind drought might be adequately represented, but are out of our power to
in fluence: wild in a practical but not epistemic sense. Bennett's uncanny encounter with the
assemblage of objects in a storm drain is an example of something that was epistemically but
not pragmatically wild.
One sort of wildness can exist without the other, but they're often interrelated–being
wild in one sense makes something more likely to be wild in the other. Jane Bennett's insight
is important here: the representational de ficit includes not just passive features of a thing, but
its active and reactive powers to affect the world. Having an inadequate representation,
excluding features that affect its behavior, means that it is more dif ficult to predict, and thus to
control, something–in part because "adequacy" is often de fined in terms of prediction.
Something that is pragmatically wild is more likely to be epistemically wild because one
common feature of taming something practically is to make it conform to one's representation
of it–disciplining animals or persons that act in unexpected ways can make them more
predictable. Thus, managing for epistemic wildness grows out of managing for pragmatic
wildness–non-intervention and allowing things to go their own way makes them more likely to
produce the experience of epistemic wildness.

4.3.1 Wildness of Art
In order to account for "how a purely graphic diagram differs from a painter's sketch, a
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contour map from an aerial photograph, a ship model from a sculpture," (Goodman 1968,
p.229) Nelson Goodman introduces the notion of repleteness. The difference between an
electrocardiogram and a Hokusai drawing of Mt. Fujiyama, according to Goodman, is that "the
constitutive aspects of the diagrammatic as compared with the pictorial character are
expressly and narrowly restricted." (Goodman 1968, p.229) That is, in the electrocardiogram,
only a few features are meaningful and the rest can be discarded. "The only relevant features
of the diagram are the ordinate and abscissa of each of the points the center of the line
passes through. The thickness of the line, its color and intensity, the absolute size of the
diagram, etc., do not matter… For the sketch, this is not true. Any thickening or thinning of the
line, its color, its contrast with the background, its size, even the qualities of the paper–none
of these is ruled out, none can be ignored." (Goodman 1968, p.229) The sketch, because of
the larger set of meaningful features, is replete. This is a matter of degree, as there are some
aspects of the sketch–what the back of the canvas looks like–that are not relevant for the
meaning of the piece.
One consequence of this is that although replete works of art are (theoretically)
possible to copy, they are resistant to representation. That is, one could make an exact
duplicate of a replete work of art, but a representation would leave out some features that are
important to the work. A smaller bronze representation of Boccioni's Unique Forms of
Continuity in Space would lack the impact of the size of the original, and the representation of
the sculpture engraved on the back of the Italian 20-cent euro coin leaves out any number of
features signi ficant to the original.
So, it seems that replete artwork always has a signi ficant representational de ficit, and
is thus epistemically wild. As Bennett points out, epistemic wildness is not limited to natural
things. So, in some sense this is just an interesting connection between nature and art, and
may go some way towards explicating the aesthetic value of nature as found in Muir and
others; the experience of a signi ficant representational de ficit is similar–one can be long
acquainted with a work of art or a wilderness and still discover new features. But there does
57

seem to be a signi ficant difference between the wildness of art and nature.
This difference is the absence of pragmatic wildness in art. Humans produce art, and
are called on to maintain it. Natural things are produced by nature, and one of the most
powerful responses that they evoke in us is to leave them to their own devices. Despite his
criticisms of wilderness, William Cronon recognizes this feature of the natural world as
valuable. "In the wilderness, we need no reminder that a tree has its own reasons for being,
quite apart from us. The same is less true in the gardens we plant and tend ourselves: there it
is far easier to forget the otherness of the tree." (Cronon 1996, p.23) That is to say that
pragmatic wildness has its own sort of value, independent of the value of epistemic wildness,
and art lacks this feature but natural things do not.

4.3.2 Wildness and Intent
In the literature surrounding the dilemma of wilderness management (e.g., Aplet and
Cole 2010, Ridder 2007), there is a distinction between human effects on nature that are
unintentional and those that are planned or intended. Writers in this context tend to see only
or primarily intentional effects as compromising wildness. "Although unintended
anthropogenic processes such as the greenhouse effect will lead to changes in nature, they
do not necessarily diminish wildness." (Ridder 2007, p.10) This distinction is crucial to the
existence of the dilemma. If we do not distinguish between intentional and unintentional
effects, unintended things like climate change would be of the same "kind" as deliberate
intervention to mediate the effects of climate change. Wildness would already be
compromised by ubiquitous human-caused change, so avoiding additional intervention could
not be justi fied in terms of preserving wildness. Tagging threatened White Bark pine stands
with pheromones to keep away the pine bark beetles that are threatening them would not
compromise wildness any more than the climate change that allowed the beetles to access
the higher elevation trees in the first place.
There are several practical reasons to make such a distinction. The first is that the
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context of the dilemma is wilderness management, and wilderness managers have a choice
of whether or not to intervene intentionally, but not over whether people around the world will
continue to emit greenhouse gasses. Second, intervention is never as simple as just
reversing the damage done; there are always signi ficant side effects, and mitigation is often
not completely successful.
But there is also a difference in kind between intentional and unintentional intervention
in terms of epistemic wildness. When people intervene in nature to achieve some goal, they
generally have a representation of how they want the result to look, whether this is a mining
pit or restoration to a pristine baseline. In forcing nature to conform to a representation, we
limit its disposition to produce epistemically wild experiences. When we make nature look like
we want it to look, even if this is a benevolent image, we're less likely to see what we were not
looking for.
This is not an argument against restoration tout court. This distinction only means that
in some cases epistemic wildness is compromised by intentional intervention, but not by
unintentional intervention. There are other factors that affect epistemic wildness, and there
are other values that may outweigh compromising it.

4.4 Wilderness and Wildness
Having described epistemic wildness, we need to say a few words about how
wilderness is epistemically wild. This kind of wildness is not synonymous with pristineness or
lack of human intervention, so the answer is not immediately obvious. Rather, there are a
number of features that tend to make experience of wilderness epistemically wildness.
First, wilderness experiences are direct. They are direct apprehension of natural things
through the senses rather than experiencing nature mediated through representations such
as pictures, films, writing, etc. This is one of the things that Turner identi fies as essential to
experiencing the "real" wild, and Thoreau and Bennett point out the importance of attention to
sensual experience of nature to appreciating wildness. Obviously, it is dif ficult to notice the
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features of a thing that are left out of a representation if all one has is the representation. This
is especially important in light of the fact that "adults are exposed to screens — TVs,
cellphones, even G.P.S. devices — for about 8.5 hours on any given day…" (Stelter 2009)
Wilderness involves actual contact with wolves, deer, rocks, and trees, and this can help us
understand how the representations of them promulgated in culture are limited. Direct
experience also involves all five senses. Quite often we think of things in only one or two
senses. Noticing how things smell is quite likely to add something to our representations–
noticing that older ponderosa pines smell like vanilla, or that the sap of black birch smells of
wintergreen can be quite a surprise to someone who has only seen the trees from books, or
through a car window.
Wilderness experiences are also likely to be wild because they are immersive. One is
in wilderness, not just looking at it. Extended contact, contact one cannot turn off, with things
makes one likely to attend to neglected features of things. Wilderness experiences involve
some amount of dif ficulty and danger–one is likely to pay careful attention to the features of a
dif ficult slope miles from any medial facilities.
Since most people do not spend much of their time in wilderness, and even
experienced wilderness travelers seldom visit the same places, spend a lot of time on the
move, and areas can have markedly different characters at different times of the year, so
wilderness is often experienced as unfamiliar. Dealing with something that has an element of
novelty tends to elicit closer attention than we pay to familiar things, and confrontation with
things of which we have relatively shallow concepts tends to make us aware of how shallow
those concepts are. People also tend to develop habitual ways of dealing with things in the
world; a change of context and practice can cause us to look at things in a new light, and
notice overlooked aspects.
Wilderness is also pragmatically wild. It is far more dif ficult to put adequate concepts to
things that are not built or shaped for human purposes. Devices and commodities are subject
to human control, and part of this control is to make sure they behave in expected ways–
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pragmatically wild things are not subject to such control, and thus tend to be more dif ficult to
fit neatly into a representation.
All of this combines into an experience that directs care and attention on the natural
surroundings, and results in a continual enrichment of one's concept of wilderness and wild
things. As Joseph Sax describes it, "The woods, for the beginner an endless succession of
indistinguishable trees apparently designed to bewilder the hapless walker, conceal a patch of
berries or an edible mushroom. Nearby, but unseen, are beautiful grazing deer or, overhead,
a soaring eagle." (Sax 1980, p.31)
Wilderness experiences tend to forcefully remind us that there is more to the world
than is contained in our concepts. Wilderness demands and rewards the close attention and
care that enables the experience of epistemic wildness. This can be a powerful reminder of
the representational de ficit that attends all things, even everyday items that do not impress
their wildness on us as forcefully. Exposure to wilderness can develop a faculty to notice and
be open to epistemic wildness, even in society. There is no greater reminder that the map is
not the territory than trying to use a map to navigate the territory.

4.5 The Value of Epistemic Wildness
Why is epistemic wildness valuable? We tend to mistake our representations for the
things that they represent. This is both inherently impoverishing, and leads to ethically
problematic consequences. Epistemic wildness is what reminds us that this is an error. The
thinkers on wildness that I talked about earlier can be seen as expounding on this basic fact
in various ways. Now that I have laid out my formulation of epistemic wildness in terms of
representation, we can brie fly outline how the values that Turner, Chapman, Bennett, and
Birch found in wildness can be understood in these terms.
For Turner, the value of wildness is that direct experience of the wild, as opposed to
simulacra, enables the sort of emotional connection required for effective environmental
action. "There is knowledge only the wild can give us, knowledge speci fic to the experience of
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it." (Turner 1996, p.26) This knowledge is the knowledge that there is always more to the wild
than we can represent. This is one of the fundamental characteristics of the experience of real
others–things that exist on their own rather than as projections of one's ego–and it is missing
or greatly diminished in experiencing mediated representations. Genuine love–a recognition
of and delight in the other, a desire to understand the world from their point of view, and a
relaxation of the need to control the other (Nussbaum 2013, p.176)–thus requires that we
experience the other as epistemically wild.
For Chapman, the value of wildness is that it allows for conceptual and social progress.
If Kuhn is right about anomalies not accounted for by the dominant scienti fic theory
accumulating until they can no longer be ignored, resulting in a scienti fic revolution, then
epistemic wildness, the experience of signi ficant features of the represented not contained in
one's representation, is one of the most important factors in scienti fic progress. The
apocryphal quote attributed to Isaac Asimov, "The most exciting phrase to hear in science,
the one that heralds new discoveries, is not 'Eureka!' (I found it!) but 'That’s funny …'"
illustrates this point. Encounters with wildness, because they serve to remind us of the
incompleteness of our concepts and organizational schemes, may also serve to call political
and social structures–the way that we represent one another–into question.
For Birch, the value of wildness is that it is counter to the western imperial project of
the domination of others. Part of this project is accomplished through pragmatic control over
others, and part through a finalized system that seeks to reduce others to their concepts.
Wildness as the experience of what about others exceeds their representations, including
their abilities to affect the world, is a counter to this project. I will say more about wildness and
respect for otherness in section 4.4.1.
For Bennett, the value of wildness is that by learning to attend to the powers of nonhuman others to act and effect change in excess of the meanings and purposes that humans
assign them, we inculcate humility and respect for others, both human and non-human.
Though the emphasis is on the abilities and capacities of things, their active rather than
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passive features, these are also part of how we represent them.

4.5.1 Wildness and Justice
One of Guha's criticisms of Deep Ecology, and its concern with wilderness
conservation, was that it furthers colonial and imperial exploitation of the third world: "…it
seriously compounds the neglect by the American movement of far more pressing
environmental problems within the Third World. But perhaps more importantly, and in a more
insidious fashion, it also provides an impetus to the imperialist yearning of Western biologists
and their financial sponsors, organizations such as the WWF and IDCN." (Guha 1989, p.76)
Callicott argues that the wilderness idea is "woefully ethnocentric" because it ignores the
"presence and effects on practically all the world's ecosystems of aboriginal peoples."
(Callicott 1991, p.348) Cronon notes that "Ever since the nineteenth century, celebrating
wilderness has been an activity mainly for well-to-do city folks." (Cronon 1996, p.15)
These criticisms can be summed up by saying that wilderness has been inimical to justice.
This is a true and important criticism of how wilderness preservation has actually
played out. But, it is not a necessary feature of wilderness. Many of the revisions to the
wilderness concept laid out in chapter three–rethinking the nature and role of pristineness,
making wilderness less central to environmentalism, allowing for a diversity of values in
wilderness–attempt to remove features that lead to this problem. This is a negative solution
that simply makes wilderness not con flict with justice. Positively, wilderness, because it
involves experience of epistemic wildness, can also be an active counter to injustice and
imperialism.
One of the central ways that injustice is justi fied is through an oppressive conceptual
framework. According to Karen Warren, a conceptual framework is "a set of basic beliefs,
values, attitudes, and assumptions which shape and re flect how one views oneself and one's
world. It is a socially constructed lens through which we perceive ourselves and others."
(Warren 1990, p.127) An oppressive conceptual framework is "one that explains, justi fies,
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and maintains relationships of domination and subordination." (Warren 1990, p.127) People in
power conceptualize others as somehow signi ficantly different from themselves, and think of
this difference as justifying domination.
This often takes the form of what Martha Nussbaum calls projective disgust: "people in
power impute animal properties that typically inspire disgust … to other groups of people,
whether African Americans, women, lower castes, Jews, or gay men–and they then use that
alleged disgustingness as a reason to refuse contact." (Nussbaum 2013, p.182) This, for
Nussbaum, is one of the central problems that must be overcome by a just society. In the
case of projective disgust, the other is represented as animalistic "in order to serve the inner
need of the dominant group for a surrogate for its own animality." (Nussbaum 2013, p.184) Of
course, this is a distorted representation: "disgust is extended from one object to another by
totally irrational processes, forms of 'magical thinking.'" (Nussbaum 2013, p.184)
Thus, one of the central supports of iniquity in all its forms is representing others as
having features that mark them as inferior–and of those in power in relationship to them as
superior–and using this representation as an excuse to dominate them. This system of
representation is not only simpli fied and inaccurate, but also taken to be exhaustive of the
other–it claims to show all, or essentially, what the other is. Epistemic wildness, experience of
signi ficant non-represented features, whether of the other or of the self, can be disruptive or
fatal to an oppressive conceptual framework. Because wilderness can promote an openness
to epistemic wildness–attentiveness, a tendency to take nothing for granted, and a readiness
to revise concepts based on experience–wilderness can aid in perceiving others and the self
as more than they are represented to be by an oppressive conceptual framework. This
includes noticing the inaccuracies of representations, and realizing that representations are
never exhaustive–there is always more to others than one's concepts of them.
This is not to say that wilderness experience necessarily leads to questioning
oppressive concepts. Marlow's encounter with wilderness in Heart of Darkness did not cause
him to reconsider his racist concept of the Africans he met, and Muir himself called for the
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expulsion of all Native Americans from Yosemite. (Dowie 2011, p.2, 9-10) But, it is at least
possible for wilderness to give us a sense of the limitations of our representations in general,
and thus to provide one possible tool for questioning oppressive systems of representation.
This possibility is strengthened by the fact that, as Warren points out, oppressive
frameworks dealing with both human and non-human others have a similar logical structure,
and, as both Warren and Nussbaum point out, much of the justi fication for oppression comes
from associations between oppressed groups and bodily, material, animalistic, nature. These
connections make it more likely that realizing the limitations of representations of wilderness
might lead to a similar realization regarding marginalized human groups.

4.5.2 Wildness and Consumerism
Ramachandra Guha identi fied overconsumption of resources by residents of the
industrialized world as one of the most serious environmental problems facing the world. For
instance, Americans emitted 16.6 tons of CO2 per capita in 2014, compared with 1.7 tons
emitted per capita by Indians. (Olivier et al. 2014) And, according to Guha, wilderness
preservation "runs parallel to the consumer society without seriously questioning its ecological
and socio-political basis." (Guha 1989, p.79) If wilderness is to be relevant to solving our most
important environmental problems, we should have an understanding of how the concept of
wilderness can be a counter to consumerism. There are a number of possible features of
wilderness experience that might lead one to question the life of consumption–voluntary
simplicity might carry over from the backcountry to everyday life, for instance. One of the most
powerful of these is epistemic wildness.
Consumerism has been de fined in any number of ways. For our purposes, we can
understand it as a vision of the good life that sees convenient pleasure as the final and selfsuf ficient end of human life, where "convenient" means without effort, waiting, or unpleasant
side effects.3 Consumerists want what they want when they want it, without having to endure
3 Many thanks to Bridget Clarke for inspiration and patience in helping develop this conception of
consumerism.
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discomfort or put forth much effort. Having asparagus available on demand would be
preferable to having to put forth the effort of cultivating it, waiting for it to grow, and only
having it at certain times of the year. Consumerism is often a de facto position on the good
life: expressed through action and choices, but not the result of conscious deliberation and
endorsement. The pursuit of this kind of pleasure can mobilize signi ficant machinery to
provide convenience, and this often results in environmental problems–having asparagus
available in January requires shipping it from Chile, and this burns a lot of fossil fuels. (c.f.
Borgmann 2000, 2003)
This notion of the good life captures much that is important to people's happiness. But
certain sorts of pleasures are left out by de finition. If inconvenience–effort, waiting,
discomfort–is an essential component of what makes something desirable, it is outside the
purview of consumerism. We might call these complex pleasures as opposed to the simple,
convenient pleasures valorized by consumerism. Mountaineering is an example:
The notion that climbers are merely adrenaline junkies chasing a righteous fix is a
fallacy, at least in the case of Everest . . . . Above the comforts of Base Camp,
the expedition in fact became an almost Calvinistic undertaking. The ratio of
misery to pleasure was greater by an order of magnitude than any other
mountain I'd been on; I quickly came to understand that climbing Everest was
primarily about enduring pain. And in subjecting ourselves to week after week of
toil, tedium, and suffering, it struck me that most of us were probably seeking,
above all, something like a state of grace. (Krakauer 1997, p.175-77)
Even in a consumerist society, people have desires for complex pleasures. But,
insidiously, there are usually consumerist options that promise to satisfy these desires while,
paradoxically, doing away with the inconvenience that is essential to them. On Everest, this
takes the form of full service, guided climbs. Paying clients often expect conveniences, and
do not have the mountaineering experience or physical fitness to make the climb without
considerable assistance, including being literally pulled up the mountain by Sherpas: "the
denizens of Everest base camp are supplied with Coke, pizza, bagels, and, incredibly, sushi.
The clients, many of whom would not otherwise be capable of such an arduous endeavor, are
then led toward the summit." (Krakoff 2003, p.427)
The appeal of climbing Mt. Everest is not just attaining the summit (which can be done
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by helicopter), but developing the skill to overcome adversity and dif ficulty. A heavily guided
trip negates much of the skill, adversity, and dif ficulty, and thus makes the endeavor largely
self-defeating. Epistemic wildness is an essential component of this. First, because the
skilled, attentive engagement that often characterizes complex pleasures necessarily involves
a gradual, sometimes frustrating, enrichment of representation of the thing engaged with.
Learning to play the violin involves adding a lot of detail to one's mental representation of the
instrument. Second, epistemic wildness is itself complex. It is often inconvenient–surprising,
uncanny, and frustrating. But, discovery, surprise, exploration, and wild otherness are also
features of the most desirable experiences. Part of the pleasure of climbing the mountain is
coming to know its unexpected depth and in finite detail.
Consumer society presents us with easily digestible and glamourous surfaces lacking
in depth. Attunement to epistemic wildness helps us understand and appreciate the value of
the surprising and the complex. In particular, wildness helps us understand the paradoxical
nature of consumerist attempts to satisfy complex desires with convenient commodities. At
least partially, this is what Turner is drawing attention to with his distinction between the
abstract and the real wild; like visitors to SeaWorld, or client climbers on Everest, people want
genuine encounters with nature, but end up accepting a convenient representation as the real
thing. Lovers of abstract nature "seek to confront 'reality' in its most extreme, and least
forgiving, form. But at the same time they have not prepared themselves, either spiritually or
physically, for such a confrontation." (Krakoff 2003, p.430) Attunement to wildness through
wilderness is one way to prepare for such a confrontation.
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Conclusion

The revised conception of wilderness I have laid out here answers many of the
problems with wilderness, but there is no one size fits all solution to the dilemma of
wilderness management. Though wildness is, I have argued, the only feature necessary for
an area to be considered a wilderness, pristineness is still often an important value of
wilderness. Sometimes they will con flict, and we can not give an algorithm for how to decide
between them in advance. However, we have seen that there are many problems with
pristineness, and that wildness, including its epistemic dimension, is valuable for solving
pressing concerns. As a general recommendation then, wildness ought to be considered the
default management option for wilderness areas, with the burden of proof falling on justifying
that a possible intervention would minimally compromise wildness and would preserve
signi ficant other value.
One major bene fit of thinking of wildness as the sole necessary component of
wilderness is that this allows for the creation of new wilderness in areas signi ficantly affected
by people. The Oostvaardersplassen and North Brother Island are examples. This possibility
makes the concept of wilderness much more relevant to the lives of people living in areas
without large tracts of relatively pristine land, and allows them to draw on the cultural
resonance of wilderness in the struggle to protect wild lands. This also makes
environmentalism, and wilderness conservation, much more optimistic and proactive. Rather
than only a struggle to defend a constantly diminishing remnant of pristine land, we can also
see wilderness lurking under the surface of developed land, showing itself once we start to
leave it alone. We can advance as well as hold the line in wilderness, and this is signi ficant if
we want to offer an attractive alternative to development. Ideally, the Wilderness Act should
be updated to allow designation of areas that are wild but not pristine. Because of political
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inertia, both in government and in wilderness advocacy, this is unlikely. But, people do not
need the act to consider areas wilderness.
Epistemic wildness accounts for much of the value of wildness, and of wilderness. This
is unfortunately overlooked when we think of wildness in only pragmatic terms. We ought to
encourage epistemic wildness in wilderness. This involves management non-intervention, but
also managing elements of wilderness experience in ways that encourage us to notice the
representational de ficit of our concepts of wilderness. Part of the reason that certain forms of
technology are banned in designated wilderness is that they discourage the sorts of close
attention and complex engagement that tends to produce experience of epistemic wildness.
We might consider extending these bans to certain forms of information technology that have
similar effects.
On an individual level, attention to epistemic wildness tends to enhance the experience
in wilderness, and the ability to spot the gap between the represented and representation in
cultural contexts. As with art, what we get out of wilderness depends on the way we approach
it. Cultivating a personal practice of attention to epistemic wildness would increase the
personal bene fits of wilderness. A useful project would be to outline such a practice.
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